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ABSTRACT

Coal Mechanization and Migration from McDowell County, West
Virginia, 1932-1970
by
Mark Myers

The economy and population of McDowell County, West Virginia,
drastically decreased between 1950 and 1970.

The increased

reliance of the coal industry, McDowell County’s primary
industry, on labor saving machinery resulted in a loss of
employment opportunities.

This study seeks to investigate the

reasons for the reliance on coal and the results of the
mechanization movement in the coal industry on McDowell County.
Using production and employment data of two representative
McDowell County coal companies, it is clear that the introduction
of continuous mining machines, which combined the cutting and
loading of the coal into one step, allowed companies to mine more
coal with fewer workers.

Because the economy of McDowell County

was so coal-intensive, the increased unemployment caused by
mechanization forced many miners to migrate to such midwestern
industrial centers as Cleveland or Columbus.

2

Copyright 2001 by Mark S. Myers
All Rights Reserved

3

DEDICATION
To Heather, without your love and support, this would not have
been possible.

4

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Dr. Marie Tedesco for her diligence in
editing and offering suggestions for the manuscript.

I

would also like to thank Dr. Emmett Essin and Dr. Elwood
Watson for reading the text and offering insightful
comments.

My parents gave me encouragement when I needed it

most, thank you.

Finally, I would like to thank the

numerous McDowell Countians who agreed to talk to me and
share with me their stories of a better time for our home.

5

CONTENTS
Page

ABSTRACT

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

COPYRIGHT

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

DEDICATION

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

Chapter
1. INTRODUCTION

2. BACKGROUND OF A COAL ECONOMY, 1880-1932

. . . . . . .

15

. . . . . .

44

. . . . . . . . . .

64

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

86

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

101

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

107

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

115

3. THE NEW DEAL AND MECHANIZATION, 1933-1941
4. COAL AND MECHANIZATION, 1941-1960
5. LEAVING MCDOWELL, 1950-1970
6. EPILOGUE
BIBLIOGRAPHY
VITA

6

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
During the twentieth century, coal powered the industrial
plants that lifted the United States to industrial supremacy and
helped win two world wars.

West Virginia provided much of the

coal that led to the industrialization of the United States.

By

the early twentieth century, West Virginia’s economy depended on
coal.

Coal became more than an industry for the people of West

Virginia: it evolved into a way of life.

The state’s dependence

on coal caused the state legislature to take steps to attract
investors and protect the coal industry.

With the help of pro-

business, anti-union, state and local governments, the coal
industry blossomed in West Virginia.
McDowell County, the southernmost county in West Virginia,
became the leading coal producing county by 1920.

Coal mining

opened up southern West Virginia to development, drove the
economy of the region, and altered many social and political
institutions.

As the century progressed, changes in the coal

industry, primarily mechanization, created many problems for the
economy of southern West Virginia.

By the early 1990s, large

scale underground coal mining had disappeared from the county,
causing the people of McDowell to leave the region in droves.

As

economic stagnation set in, it was unclear what the future held

7

for McDowell.

Why did the economic disaster that affected

McDowell County take place?

Where did the county’s people go?

The migration of former miners from McDowell County was
similar to the larger migration affecting the rest of the
southern Appalachian region.

Between 1950 and 1960, the southern

Appalachian region lost more than one million people through
migration.

People left their homes throughout the region because

of the opportunities available in other areas.

The similarities

between the migration in McDowell and the rest of southern
Appalachia end there, however.

The southern Appalachian region

is not an entirely homogenous area.

Different parts of southern

Appalachia have different values and social patterns, nullifying
any opportunity for a sense of unity that could classify them as
belonging to a region.

Rather, southern Appalachia is an

arbitrary grouping of diverse areas that are not closely related
culturally or economically.1
In regard to migration, there are two specific sections of
note in southern Appalachia.

Migration from McDowell County is

similar to migratory patterns of Appalachian coal mining areas,
specifically eastern Kentucky, West Virginia, and southwest
Virginia.

As the number of men employed in mining declined in

1

James S. Brown and George A. Hillery, Jr., “The Great
Migration, 1940-1960,” in Thomas R. Ford, ed., The Southern
Appalachian Region: A Survey (Lexington: University of Kentucky
Press, 1962), 54-55.
8

the coal fields, out-migration increased.

My study is a case

study of the effect mechanization had on the demographics of coal
mining areas.

Other areas, including western North Carolina and

East Tennessee, included people who farmed for a living.

Farmers

realized that higher wages and better lives could be found in the
city.

The migration of farmers from Appalachia exemplified the

nationwide trend of moving from farm to city.2
Study of the population loss in the county is significant
for two reasons.

First, because the county relied so heavily on

the coal industry, there was no available work for unemployed
miners.

Secondly, the subsequent migration of McDowell County’s

youth resulted in an upward shift in the average age of its
population.

The best and the brightest migrated, causing the

county to become in many ways, a dependency of the federal
government.

If future generations understand that exclusive

reliance on one industry is economically dangerous, then it is
possible to restore McDowell’s economy.

Many migrants would have

gladly returned home if stable employment was available to them.
The coal industry of the mid-twentieth century was an
industry of change.

As the technology of coal evolved from hand

loading to machine loading to continuous mining via machine,
employment levels declined.

It is clear that mechanization did

not affect the economy of the county until the period from 1955
2

Ibid., 58, 61.
9

to 1960.

The continuous mining machine, which combined the tasks

of cutting and loading coal into one process, gained widespread
use by the late 1950s.

The continuous mining machine was the

single most influential invention causing unemployment in the
coal industry and the migration of people from McDowell in the
1950s and 1960s.3
Several reasons caused the increased use of machinery in the
coal mines.

New Deal legislation led to development and

implementation of labor-saving machinery.

The passage of the

National Industrial Recovery Act(NIRA) in 1933 included a section
that guaranteed the right of workers to collective bargaining.
The collective bargaining clause of the NIRA resulted in the
successful organizing drive of the United Mine Workers(UMWA) in
the previously non-union coalfields of southern West Virginia,
raising labor costs in the process.

Although the NIRA was

declared unconstitutional in 1935, Congress passed the Wagner Act
to protect miners’ rights to collective bargaining.

To offset

the loss suffered by rising labor costs, coal operators
increasingly turned to machinery.

The introduction of coal

loading machines changed the coal industry, yet it did not affect
3

Ronald L. Lewis, Black Coal Miners in America: Race, Class,
and Community Conflict, 1780-1980 (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1987), 178-180; Curtis Seltzer, Fire in the Hole: Miners
and Managers in the American Coal Industry (Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 1985), 65; Crandall A. Shifflett, Coal Towns:
Life, Work, and Culture in Company Towns of Southern Appalachia,
1880-1960 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 204.
10

McDowell County.

The problems facing the county in the early

1930s were a result of the economic collapse that precipitated
the Great Depression.4
There were many different types of machinery available to
coal operators during the first half of the twentieth century.
Early cutting and loading machines, such as the one developed by
Colonel Edward O’Toole, were predecessors of the continuous
mining machines.

The early machines were not successful because

of the room and pillar method of mining used in the coal industry
in the 1920s and 1930s.

The room and pillar method divided the

mine into different areas, leaving a miner in charge of an
individual area.

The miner controlled all aspects of the mining

process, from cutting, blasting, and loading the coal to taking
any necessary safety precautions.

The most important mechanical

development during the 1930s was the Joy loader, invented by
Joseph Joy.

The Joy loader was a scoop that loaded the coal

after it had been blasted by the miner.

By the 1940s most coal-

loading machines used in McDowell County were built by the Joy
company.5
4

Robert F. Himmelberg, The Origins of the National Recovery
Administration: Business, Government, and the Trade Association
Issue, 1921-1933 (New York: Fordham University Press, 1976), 207;
Jerry B. Thomas, An Appalachian New Deal: West Virginia in the
Great Depression (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1998),
106.
5

Keith Dix, What’s a Coal Miner to do? The Mechanization of
Coal Mining (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 3511

Production and employment of McDowell County mines
demonstrate the effect of World War II and mechanization on the
mines of McDowell County.
County coal companies.

My study focuses on two McDowell

The Carter Coal Company operated three

mines around Coalwood and Caretta:

Olga #1 and #2, and Caretta.

The Peerless Coal Company operated in Vivian.

In terms of

production and employment, Carter Coal was a reasonably large
company, but Peerless was a somewhat small operation.

The

records of both companies give insights about mechanization and
employment demographics of their mines.

The statistics reveal

that increased use of machinery and the development of continuous
mining machines led to the termination of many miners.

Many of

the smaller operations did not have the capital necessary to
mechanize and could not produce the tonnage of coal necessary to
keep up with the competition nationwide.

By 1960, the coal

industry quit being profitable for small operations and forced
many of the small mines, including Peerless, to close.6
The cutbacks caused by mechanization forced many former
miners to make tough decisions for their families.

Some decided

to stay in McDowell County and take their chances, but many more
packed up and left the county.

The destinations for most

38, 65-68.
6

State of West Virginia, Annual Report of the Department of
Mines (Charleston: 1960), 62-63.
12

Appalachian migrants were midwestern, industrial cities.

For

McDowell migrants, the common destinations were the cities of
Cleveland and Columbus, Ohio.

Both cities offered industrial

jobs and a chance at a better life.

Although discrimination and

poverty were constant aspects of the migrant’s life, life was
much better for migrants who resided in the cities than it was in
the decaying towns of McDowell.

Migrant children could receive a

good education, which was an important opportunity that was
valued greatly by many migrants.

Migrants received good jobs

with good wages, and the possibility of home ownership was a
reality for many of them.7
Residents left behind in McDowell County faced a tenuous
situation.

Although the coal industry improved by 1970, many

areas of the county became mired in poverty and despair.

The

problems facing Eureka Hollow, an obscure McDowell County coal
camp, was an example of the hard times faced by many who stayed
in McDowell.

Jobs were nonexistent.

dependency was rampant.

Money was tight.

Welfare

The promise of a better tomorrow did not

exist for the inhabitants of places such as Eureka Hollow.8

7

Chad Berry, Southern Migrants, Northern Exiles (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 2000), 104-105; John Photiadis,
Selected Social and Sociopsychological Characteristics of West
Virginians in their Own State and in Cleveland, Ohio (Morgantown:
West Virginia University Appalachian Center, 1970), 56-61.
8

Bill Peterson, Coaltown Revisited: An Appalachian Notebook
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1972), 4-6.
13

The aforementioned issues are paramount to the dramatic
population loss in McDowell County from 1950 to 1970.

Most

importantly, it is pertinent to examine the development of the
coal industry in the county.

To fully understand the results of

mechanization on the residents of southern West Virginia requires
comprehension of the rise of the coal industry.

The coal

industry grew in McDowell County for many reasons, leading to the
domination of McDowell’s economy by coal.

14

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND OF A COAL ECONOMY, 1880-1932
State government officials knew of the existence of coal in
the western part of Virginia as early as the eighteenth century.
The extent of coal deposits were so immense that Thomas Jefferson
wrote in Notes on Virginia, “In the western country coal is known
to be in so many places, as to have induced an opinion, that the
whole tract between the Laurel Mountain, Missisipi, and Ohio
yields coal.”1

The exact value of the coal reserves, however,

would not be known until the beginning of the industrial age,
when the needs of the steel industry provided an impetus to
development of the coal industry.2
The state first promoted its untapped wealth of natural
resources as early as 1864.

In 1870 the state sponsored the

publication of the West Virginia Handbook and Immigrants Guide.
Written by Joseph H. Debar, the handbook encouraged new
immigrants to the United States to come and work in the West
Virginia coalfields.

It was essential for West Virginia to

encourage industry because there were few economic opportunities
available in the mountainous sections of the state.

Many

1

Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, ed. William
Pedan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1954), 28.
2

David Corbin, Life, Work, and Rebellion in the Coal Fields:
The Southern West Virginia Miners, 1880-1922 (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1981), 2.
15

developers and state officials believed that promotion of the
natural resources of West Virginia could overcome geographical
barriers of communication and transport.

But, the early

advertising promoting the coal industry was largely ineffective
in southern West Virginia.

At the end of the 1870s, southern

West Virginia still was an isolated and agrarian region.
Farmers, hunters, and extended families-sometimes called clansoccupied the region.

It was not until the entrance of the

railroad into southern West Virginia in the late nineteenth
century that the state became largely industrialized.

The growth

of the coal industry in southern West Virginia transformed the
region into an industrialized and economic colony of outside
forces that possessed the capital needed to infiltrate the
region.

The coal industry replaced the traditional family values

of the native population with new industrial values that were
designed to consolidate the power of coal companies amid the
influx of thousands of immigrants.3
Despite the possibilities afforded by the vast coal deposits
of southern West Virginia, the coal industry was not the first
industry in the Southern Mountains.

The timber industry entered

McDowell County before coal could gain a foothold.
3

The wealth of

Ronald
Eller,
Miners,
Millhands,
and
Mountaineers:
Industrialization of the Appalachian South (Knoxville: University
of Tennessee Press, 1982), 46-47; John A. Williams, West Virginia
and the Captains of Industry (Morgantown: West Virginia University
Library, 1976), 166. Corbin, 1.
16

virgin timber attracted many businessmen to invest in timber.
Major lumber companies entered McDowell County and had reached
peak production by 1895.

Although the railroad transported most

timber in McDowell, railroad officials primarily built the
Norfolk and Western Railroad to take advantage of the enormous
coal reserves. The promotion of coal by the state government as a
more profitable industry hindered the progress of the timber
industry and tied the future of McDowell to coal.4
The state’s promotion of the coal industry, while
significant, was not the most influential factor at hastening the
development of coal mining.

Private speculators knew that a

fortune could be made in coal lands, and so they threw enormous
amounts of energy into promoting the coalfields.

Speculators had

their eye on McDowell County and began to enter remote areas of
the county during the 1880s.

In order to gain control of the

land, and more importantly, mineral rights, land speculators
resorted to unscrupulous methods.

The arrival of speculators who

would do anything to gain control of the land resulted in a land
boom unseen before in McDowell County.5

4

Phil Conley, History of the West Virginia Coal Industry
(Charleston, WV: Education Foundation, 1960), 228; Ronald L. Lewis,
Transforming the Appalachian Countryside: Railroads, Deforestation,
and Social Change in West Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1998), 60.
5

Eller, 48, 52.
17

To evict the native landholders, speculators found a local
federal judge who, for a bribe, agreed to rule that the “deeds”
held by speculators were the original and legal deeds.

Despite

the support of the United States Supreme Court, many of the
county’s natives could not afford the legal fees necessary to
appeal local decisions.

The unscrupulous methods used to evict

the native landowners began a long tradition of economic and
political corruption in the coalfields of southern West
Virginia.6
The ease of mining coal in McDowell County aided the growth
of the coal industry.
entry easy.
problem.

Large seams and hillside exposure made

Flooding, a common mining dilemma, was not a

Elevation of the mines made pumping water unnecessary

because the hills provided excellent drainage.
mining coal in another way.
coal out of the mines.

Geography helped

The slopes eased the hauling of the

Without these advantages, the coal

industry in West Virginia may not have developed as extensively
as it did.7
There was one major barrier that had to be crossed before
widespread industrial growth of southern West Virginia could
begin, that of transporting coal to market.

The lack of adequate

transportation out of the region rendered the southern West

6

Corbin, 3.

7

Ibid., 5.
18

Virginia coal useless.

In the early 1880s, officials of the

Norfolk and Western Railroad began construction of a rail line
into the coalfields of the Flat Top region, an area that included
the Pocahontas and Winding Gulf coalfields, and encompassed
McDowell, Mercer, Wyoming, and Raleigh counties.8
In the early 1880s, however, railroad companies neither
possessed the technological knowledge nor the finances to
penetrate the mountains.

No capitalist was willing to commit

large sums of money to a railroad project in West Virginia
without reasonable hope for profit.

During this decade railroad

companies learned more effective tunneling techniques that
allowed the railroads to cross the mountains through an extensive
network of tunnels, and notable financiers, among them John D.
Rockefeller, paid for the building of railroads.

The first wave

of railroad construction in the late 1880s opened up to
development the Flat Top coalfield of Mercer and Raleigh
counties.

Soon after the construction of the first railroads,

speculators bought the majority of land in southern West
Virginia, and thereafter speculation became a distinguishing
characteristic of the early industrialization of the region.9
8

W.P. Tams, The Smokeless Coal Fields of West Virginia: A Brief
History (Morgantown: West Virginia University Library, 1963), 19;
Joe William Trotter, Coal, Class, and Color: Blacks in Southern
West Virginia, 1915-1932 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1990), 12-13.
9

Tams, 19; Corbin, 2.
19

The coal industry did not enter McDowell County and the
Pocahontas coalfields on a large scale until 1892 and 1893, with
the completion of the Norfolk and Western Railroad’s Ohio Branch,
which traveled through Mingo County to Kenova on the Ohio River.
The construction of the line gave McDowell County mines an
opening in the coal markets of the Great Lakes because it
connected McDowell County with the industrial centers of the
Midwest.

The new markets gave operators more flexibility by

allowing them to sell coal to different markets.10
The United States’ entry into World War I in April, 1917,
brought a new vitality to the coalfields.

War industries,

primarily in the Midwest, needed to produce large amounts of
munitions and other wartime necessities.

The new munitions

factories required coal and because there was a shortage of coal,
the industry expanded.
expanded.

Many new mines opened and older mines

Throughout the United States, the number employed in

coal mining rose from less than 200,000 in 1890 to more than
600,000 in 1920.

After the war, there were two other reasons for

the continued solvency of the coal industry in southern West
Virginia.

First, a coal shortage in war-torn Europe allowed

McDowell County coal to keep its domination of coal production in
the world market.

10

Second, a nationwide strike of union miners in

Tams, 19; Eller, 132.
20

the early 1920s took these mines out of competition with the nonunion mines in McDowell.11
The industrialization of southern West Virginia affected
traditional ways of life by destroying the extended family
clan.12

Clans developed because of the isolation of the mountain

regions during the nineteenth century.

The support system

provided by the clan allowed families to thrive in the
wilderness.

The Hatfield family, involved in the famous

Hatfield-McCoy feud, was the quintessential mountain clan.

But

the family clan could not survive in an industrializing economy.
By the 1890s, a general perception formed in the media about
mountaineer culture as lawless and unsuited to the march of
civilization.

The media popularized the idea of mountain culture

as anarchical by publishing sensational accounts of mountain
feuds.

The Wheeling Intelligencer argued that “Capitalists

refuse to come and prospect because they say they are afraid of
our outlaws.

You cannot get them to go into the interior to

11

O.E. Kissling, “Coal Mining in the South,” Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 153 (January
1931): 88-89; Malcolm Ross, Machine Age in the Hills (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1933) 50-51; Morton Baratz, The Union and the
Coal Industry, Reprint ed. (New York: Kennikat Press, 1973), 52-57.
12

In this work, the word “clan” is used loosely to describe
mountain families before industrialization.
For further
information, consult: Altina L. Waller, Feud: Hatfields, McCoys,
and Social Change in Appalachia, 1860-1900 (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1988).
21

inspect our timber and coal lands for fear they will be
ambushed.”13
The eventual industrialization of the region destroyed the
clan and forced families to make tough decisions.

The Hatfields,

for example, found themselves on opposite sides of the mineroperator dispute.

Some became politicians.

Henry D. Hatfield

served as governor, 1913-1917, and as United States Senator,
1929-1935.

Others became coal operators, while some became

miners.14
The native, white population of southern West Virginia could
not supply a work force adequate for the needs of the growing
coal industry.

In 1880, McDowell County had a population of

3,078, of which 3,071 were white.

As the coal industry entered

McDowell County, the needs of coal companies required that labor
be imported from other areas.

By 1890, McDowell County’s

population had risen to 7,347, of which 5,260, or 71.7 percent,
were white.

By 1910, the McDowell County population rose to

47,856, of which 25,196, or 52.6 percent, were American-born
whites.

The preponderant majority of whites living in McDowell

County were migrants themselves, as the native whites living in

13

Wheeling Intelligencer, 23 November 1889; Waller, 232.

14

Waller, 232; Corbin, 7.
22

McDowell in 1880 could not have reproduced the numbers necessary
to support the large population increase.15
To meet their labor requirements, coal operators brought in
African Americans and immigrants from such nations as Russia,
Italy, and Romania.

Operators recruited both African Americans

and Europeans because they worked for significantly cheaper wages
than did native whites.

The operators influenced labor recruits

by offering them a way of life better than that they had known
previously.

Although the recruitment of African American miners

increased the rate of black migration, blacks soon formed their
own immigration networks.

It was difficult for married men to

migrate because they invariably left their families behind until
they could afford to join the men.

Paying African American and

European migrants sub-standard wages not only kept operating
costs down and profits high but also continued the exploitation
of McDowell County miners.16
The bituminous coal mined in southern West Virginia
beginning in the early twentieth century quickly became renown
for its superior quality.. West Virginia coal had the highest
heat unit, which is the amount of heat energy produced as coal is
burned, and produced the best steam in the United States.

It had

a low content of ash and sulphur, which made it the most fuel

15

Trotter, 19.

16

Ibid., 24-25.
23

efficient and best cooking coal in the country.

West Virginia

coal became so popular with both industry and the general public,
that the region’s mines captured the most profitable national
markets.

For instance, the midwestern industries and the United

States Navy both preferred West Virginia coal.

McDowell County

was probably most affected by the increase in demand.

Coal

output in McDowell rose from 246,000 tons in 1889 to 3.5 million
tons in 1899, to 12 million tons in 1910.17
The effort to organize coal miners into a labor union
determined the economic success of McDowell County.

The United

Mine Workers of America(UMWA), organized in 1890 as a result of
the merger of National Trades Assembly 135 of the Knights of
Labor and the National Progressive Union, initially was a weak
union.

A successful strike in the coalfields of Illinois,

Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania in 1902, resulted in the
acceptance of collective bargaining in those coalfields and gave
the union new life.

Membership steadily increased from a low of

33,000 members in 1897 to more than 400,000 in 1917.

Many miners

came into the union because of the desire for increased benefits
and improvements in their quality of life.18

17

Rita K. Hessley, John W. Reasoner, and John T. Riley, Coal
Science: An Introduction to Chemistry, Technology, and Utilization
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1986), 81; Corbin, 4-5.
18

Gary M. Fink, ed. Labor Unions (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1977), 228; Baratz, 52-57.
24

UMWA activists realized that industrial democracy meant the
right of the majority to make decisions.

The union leaders also

realized, however, that an oppressive system, controlled by a
strong minority, could trample on the rights of a weaker
majority.

John L. Lewis, who rose to the presidency of the

union, exemplified the belief system of the UMWA.

When he

attended school, Lewis was one of six boys entrusted to carry
coal for the school.

The boys felt that they should be paid to

do the work, so Lewis suggested they strike.

The principal knew

about the plan and punished the insurrectionists.

The principal

knew that the boys had a legitimate grievance but argued that
they should have spoken to him first.

The event taught Lewis

much about timing which would aid him in future negotiations for
the UMWA.19
The UMWA sought to unionize all coal miners in the United
States.

Yet, before 1920, the union did not make much progress

in its efforts to organize southern West Virginia because one of
the primary issues that concerned the union was that of uniform
national wage rates.

The southern West Virginia operators

believed that the union was illegal, moreover, after learning of
the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, they saw it as a communist

19

Martin Dubofsky and Warren Van Tyne, John L. Lewis: A
Biography (New York: Quadrangle, 1977), 13-14; John Hutchinson,
“John L. Lewis: To the Presidency of the UMWA,” Labor History 19
(Spring 1978): 187.
25

plot to destroy American industry.

Most importantly, however,

because the union could not secure agreements for uniform wage
rates from southern West Virginia companies, these producers
could pay lower wages and market more coal in important markets
such as those on the Great Lakes.

The failure of unionization

was one significant contributing factor to the industrialization
of McDowell County.20
There were many small mines that lined the hollows of
McDowell County.

They dominated the landscape, yet many mines

did not have the technology nor the capacity to mine a
significant tonnage of coal.

Throughout the history of McDowell

County a few companies produced most of the county’s coal.

The

larger companies had the resources to hire significant numbers of
workers, to keep them satisfied with social improvements, and to
use machinery to increase the rate of production.21
One of the most important companies in McDowell County was
the United States Coal and Coke Company(U.S. Coal and Coke),
which operated mines around the town of Gary, West Virginia.
U.S. Coal and Coke, a subsidiary of the United States Steel
corporation, had the resources to open many mines in the Gary
area, so that by 1923 the company had become the largest coal

20

Baratz, 46.

21

Eller, 134.
26

producer in West Virginia.

The company would be central to the

economy of McDowell County for many more years.22
U.S. Coal and Coke pioneered mechanization of McDowell
County mines.

The company instituted the first successful

cutting and loading machines in the county in the early 1900s.
The cutting machines undercut the coal before a charge of powder
was detonated to loosen the coal.

The undercutting machines were

electrically driven, short-wall mining machines.23
The early machine movement did not decrease the number of
mining jobs available in McDowell County. Most of the machines
did not cause mass terminations of workers because they were
designed to aid the workers, not to replace them.24

Each miner’s

responsibilities included all operations within a certain area of
a mine.

The miner undercut the coal seam, blasted the coal,

loaded the coal, and made any necessary safety precautions.

It

was not until the widespread use of loading machines and

22
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and

the

Miner,”

Besides the undercutting machines, other machines that
entered the mines during the first couple of decades of the
twentieth century included the moving belt, the electric drill, and
loading machines.
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continuous mining machines of the late 1950s that many jobs were
lost to machines.25
Beginning about the turn of the century, McDowell County
experienced rapid economic growth never before seen in the
region.

Economic historian Mancur Olson argued that rapid

economic growth led to political and social instability.
was true in West Virginia.

This

The political instability that

characterized southern West Virginia led to a coalition of procoal politicians and businessmen gaining control of local and
state governments.

The political factions that controlled West

Virginia politics during the early twentieth century were deeply
connected to the coal establishment.

Throughout the early years

of the industry, the political establishment protected the
interests of coal operators by controlling both members of the
United States Congress and the governor.

Moreover, the

political-business coalition controlled the important committees
of Mines and Mining, and Labor and Immigration in the West
Virginia state legislature.

The leaders of the establishment

included dynamic political figures as Governor William A.
MacCorkle, and Senators Henry G. Davis and Stephen B. Elkins.
Until the dawn of the New Deal, McDowell County coal miners could
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expect little political help for any grievances they may have had
against the coal companies.26
The rapid economic growth of southern West Virginia led to a
significant increase in violence in the Southern Mountains.

For

example, the union’s efforts at organizing led to violence.

In

1912, thousands of non-union and union miners, supported by the
UMWA, walked out of their jobs in the Paint Creek district of
Kanawha and Fayette counties.

The miners formed a militant

solidarity that captured the imaginations of radicals and
socialists throughout the country.
the miners came at a cost, however.
committed atrocities:

The solidarity formed amongst
Both sides of the strike

Mother Jones, for instance, held up the

bloody coat of a wounded mine guard and screamed: “This is the
first time I ever saw a goddamned mine guard’s coat decorated to
suit me.”27

Mine guards attacked the tent towns of the striking

miners and sprayed them with bullets, not caring who was hit, be
it women, men, or children.

The violence that occurred at Paint

Creek was characteristic of the violence that affected much of
southern West Virginia before the New Deal.28
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Despite being controlled by the coal establishment, the West
Virginia legislature passed several laws to aid miners.
them were several dealing with the use of scrip.

Among

Scrip was a

form of payment that could only be used in the company store.
The goal of the scrip system was to sell the miner necessary
goods at inflated prices.

Thus, the system took a miner’s wages

and gave them back to the company.

The exploitation of this

system was so obvious that the legislature took action to ease
the miners’ plight.

One law, passed in 1887, required that coal

companies pay their workers in lawful money.

A second law,

passed in 1891, took a further step and outlawed scrip
outright.29
But the laws passed by the legislature giving miners relief
from exploitation were ineffective.

The coal operators had

enough political power to ignore the laws passed against scrip.
The companies still paid miners in outlawed forms, and did so
until the New Deal.

The laws against scrip were not the only

state laws ignored by operators.

Other laws ignored included

requirements to keep a checkweighman on the tipples.

A

checkweighman ensured that the operator paid a miner accurately
for the load of coal he produced.

From the 1880s to the 1930s,

miners were paid by how much they produced, not by the hours they
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worked.

Without a checkweighman on the tipples, the company

could–and often did–shortchange the miner.30
Operators also ignored a prohibition, enacted by the
legislature, against interfering with peaceful efforts of a union
to organize workers.

Prior to the New Deal, operators saw the

UMWA as a plot that was un-American and harmful to business.

The

connection between the coal establishment and political leaders
worked to control the miners and, thus, destroy the unionist
movement.

Because of the lack of political power held by the

miners, the state legislature passed laws that seemed to aid the
miners, yet were victories for the operators.

For example, the

state legislature passed a Workers’ Compensation law in 1913.
The legislation seemed to be a significant victory for the
miners, but the law exempted operators from damage suits by
injured miners.

The statute protected the operators because

previous damage suits often were won by the miners.

The

political power of the operators was such that the bills that
passed the legislature had the blessing of the coal
establishment.31
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The coal operators, determined to keep the union from
organizing the southern West Virginia coalfields, unified to
oppose the UMWA.

Coal operator George Wolfe explained the new

policy in a letter to his colleague Justin Collins:

“The

operators of the Pocahontas coalfield unanimously agreed by 100%
of the tonnage that this District would make a determined fight
against the impending invasion by the United Mine Workers of
America.”32

In addition to flaunting their political power, the

coal operators used other methods to keep the union from
organizing the southern West Virginia coalfields.

Many of the

operators in the Pocahontas coalfield–which includes McDowell
County–forced their new employees sign a contract known as a
yellow-dog contract.

The yellow-dog contract was so exploitative

that the state court system characterized it as a contract
between master and servant. There were several types of yellowdog contracts, but the most commonly-used one specified that the
employer would not employ a member of a union, and that the
employee would neither join a union nor aid in the organization
of a union.

The operators thus tried to get as many employees as

possible to sign yellow-dog contracts:

then, if the union

persisted in organizing McDowell County, the operators intended

32
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to secure injunctions against the UMWA for “interfering” with
their labor.33
The operators could require their workers to sign yellow-dog
contracts because the nature of the coal camps allowed the
operators to exercise their power over the miners.34

The camps

were unincorporated, so the operators had control of everyday
life.

Within the towns company officials filled such diverse

roles as mayor and school superintendent.
scrutinized every move made by the miners.

The mine operator
Operators suppressed

political activity among the miners and censored miners’ mail to
further control their towns.

The miner lived in company housing

and if a miner lost his job, his family would be put out into the
streets.
paycheck.

Thus, a miner’s job was much more important than a
His family’s survival was at stake.35

If the company suspected a miner of harboring union
sympathizers or of aiding the establishment of a union, the
company could, and did, search miners’ houses at will.

If any

unauthorized activity was found to be occurring, the companies

33
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could evict the miners without due process of law.

The company

sent the mine guards to remove the miners and their families from
the premises.

Guards willfully damaged miners’ personal

possessions when they roughly dumped miners’ belongings into the
street.

Guards–-thugs really--evicted the miners without concern

for life or property.

The eviction process was so inhumane that,

for example, during the Paint Creek strike, mine guards evicted a
pregnant woman who was in labor.36
Despite the control exerted by the operators over miners’
lives, miners still protested oppressive working and living
conditions.

Geographic mobility was the most effective protest.

Miners drifted from town to town in search of higher wages,
improved living and working conditions, and enhanced
opportunities for advancement in the workplace.

African American

miners moved in order to escape racial prejudice.

The mobility

of southern West Virginia miners eventually led to the
development of a strong, collective mentality because miners
worked and lived in many places.

Each miner was a member of a

large coal mining community that encompassed the five coal fields
of southern West Virginia.

More importantly, common experiences

with operators and camp life brought miners together.37
36

Coal Age 4 (12 July 1913): 66; Corbin, 9-10.

37

Isaac Hourwich, Immigration and Labor: The Economic Aspects
of European Immigration to the United States, Reprint ed. (New
York: AMS Press, 1972), 421; Corbin, 40-42.
34

The coal operators sought to slow the rate of migration
among their miners by hiring married men who had families and
were more willing to work harder and longer to support their
families.

The cost of moving from town to town was so great, and

so stressful on the families, that married men were significantly
less mobile than single men who had no ties to a specific area.
Operators also stemmed the tide of migration by improving
conditions in the coal towns.38
Mobility became an important form of protest primarily
because of the failure of the UMWA.

Without the protection

afforded by organized labor, miners had few other options to
protest the exploitation of the coal town system.

While it is

true that political control of the state government by the coal
operators adversely affected unionization, the primary reason
that miners did not begin to unionize before 1912 was that the
union raised concerns, such as higher wages and shorter hours,
that were not yet significant to the miners of southern West
Virginia.

The important issues to the miners were those that

they believed affected their families, jobs, and way of life:
including the mine guard system, free trade, the checkweighman,
and the scrip system.

The union’s priorities did not gain

support in southern West Virginia because of the traditional
38
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working of the mine system.

Higher wages and shorter hours were

not important because the miners did not work set hours and were
paid by the amount of coal mined.

Without addressing the

concerns that directly affected the miners, the union had little
chance of success in southern West Virginia.39
The emergence of coal towns on the landscape of McDowell
County defined the importance of the coal industry to the miners’
way of life.

Companies built coal towns because, when the coal

operators began to enter McDowell County, the area was desolate.
The isolation of the area required the construction of company
housing.

Because few settlements could support the influx of

laborers pouring into McDowell County company towns sprang up
and, beginning around 1900, began to dominate the landscape.40
More miners lived in company housing in West Virginia than
in any other state in the union.

The isolation of the mountain

mines and the domination of the landscape by the company towns
made them an integral part of life.

The town quickly became the

dominant influence on community and social life.

The social

institutions included in the towns, stores, churches,
recreational facilities became a form of social power.

The

companies owned the towns and controlled them in such a way that
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upheld the interests of the company.

The emergence of the coal

town constituted another example of the transference of social
power from traditional sources to the new industrial power, the
coal companies.

The price of economic success for southern West

Virginia was political and social control by the companies.41
Another reason that company towns were so important to the
coal officials was that before 1900 mountaineers only worked
seasonally, when they could leave their farms.

These early

miners never thought of coal mining as a career.

They considered

mining as a way to make extra money to supplement their seasonal
farm incomes.

To combat the labor shortage and to persuade the

mountaineers that mining was the best way to make a living, the
operators tried to invoke a sense of stability with social
institutions such as schools, churches, and civic clubs.

The

ultimate goal of the coal operators was to secure a more
permanent, family-based labor force.42
Once the labor force was in place, the companies had to
ensure that their workers would not have a reason to leave.

The

continued migration of unhappy workers forced the operators
continually to improve social conditions in their towns.

By the

mid-1920s, conditions improved considerably in the coal towns.
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Operators installed baths and electric hookups in miners’ homes.
Such recreational facilities as theaters, restaurants, dance
halls, bowling alleys, pool rooms, and baseball fields,
constructed by the operators, improved the quality of life in the
coal towns of McDowell County.

Operators also built clubhouses

to house bachelors and newlyweds.

The facilities built by the

companies helped to soften the sting of the miners’ lot in life,
yet only larger companies, such as U.S. Coal and Coke, offered
such amenities.

The smaller operators did not have the capital

to offer such benefits to their workers, so it was very difficult
for them to keep workers for an extended period of time.

Miners

simply moved to the larger towns, where houses had indoor
plumbing and electric lights.43
Operators knew that leisure activities were paramount to the
satisfaction of the miners.

Thus, most of the coal camps, even

the smaller ones, fielded a baseball team that traveled from camp
to camp to play ball.

Operators built the ballfields, bought the

uniforms, and subsidized road games to keep the miners satisfied
and to keep the union out of McDowell County.

Baseball games

were very popular, as crowds of several hundred people attended
the games.

By the mid-1950s, Welch continued the coal field

baseball tradition by fielding a professional baseball team, the
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Miners, who played in the Class D Appalachian League.44

In a

historical sense, the importance of baseball to the residents of
the coal towns was another example of the importance of coal not
only to the economy but also to the way of life of the residents
of McDowell County.45
Another example of the impact of coal on the society of
McDowell County was the influence of the immigrants who entered
the county.

In addition to the native white mountaineers, the

migrants who entered McDowell to work the mines were black
southerners, and southern and eastern Europeans.

The interaction

of these three groups of migrants contributed to the society of
McDowell County.46
After the Pocahontas mines opened in 1892, African Americans
from Virginia and North Carolina entered the coalfields.

After

1900, operators recruited blacks from Alabama to work in the
southern West Virginia coalfields.

Many times operators sent

professional labor agents south to persuade African Americans to
come to West Virginia.

Often these agents doubled as guards

44
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hired by Baldwin-Felts, the preeminent mine guard company in West
Virginia.

While Baldwin-Felts men coerced a small number of

African Americans into moving to West Virginia, most African
Americans willingly migrated to West Virginia.

Despite their

common origin in the tenant farming system, blacks migrated to
southern West Virginia for several different reasons.

The first

being that African Americans could make a better living as coal
miners than as tenant farmers.

The second, and probably the most

important, reason was that West Virginia had no official Jim Crow
laws.

True, many public facilities were separate, but, unlike

other southern states, facilities for African Americans and
whites were similar in quality.

African Americans worked in both

skilled and unskilled positions.

Because of the inherent race

prejudice in the larger society, blacks rarely assumed positions
of authority in the mines(e.g. mine foreman).

Race relations

were intimate and friendly due to the close proximity in which
the miners worked.
together.

White and black miners worked and ate

Systematic white discrimination of black miners did

not occur because there was no separate pay scale for white and
black miners.47
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Because of the equitable pay scale, there was a decrease in
race consciousness in favor of an increase in socioeconomic class
consciousness.

Many of the miners formed a cohesion because they

perceived themselves to be members of an oppressed class.

Both

white and black miners had to support one another because the
coal companies politically and socially oppressed all miners,
regardless of race.

One interesting example of good relations

between African American and white miners was found in the
“Cinder Bottom” section of Keystone, a merchant town in the
eastern section of McDowell County.
its brothels.

Cinder Bottom was famous for

Some brothels in Cinder Bottom catered to black

patrons only, some to white patrons only, but most were not
particular about the race of their customers.

In contrast, a

resident of Tazewell County, Virginia, when visiting Keystone in
the early part of the century, was appalled because the white
prostitutes entertained African American miners.48
Black residents also held considerable political influence
in parts of McDowell County.

The white officials of Keystone had

to cater to the whims of the black community, else they would
find themselves voted out of office very quickly. From the mid1920s to 1995, McDowell County sent at least one black member to
48
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the West Virginia House of Delegates.

The African American

community of the county even published its own newspaper, the
McDowell Times.

There were many opportunities for hard-working

black miners in McDowell County.

Things were so good that the

editor of the Times, M.T. Whittico, stated that West Virginia was
“a veritable Eldorado for the industrious Negro.”49
Because of the quality of race relations and the number of
opportunities available to African Americans in McDowell County,
the county quickly had the largest concentration of black labor
in the coalfields.

For instance, in 1908, McDowell County had

11,483 miners employed in their coal mines.

Of these 11,483

miners, about 5,000, or 43.1 percent, were black.

In 2000,

McDowell County still has a large percentage of black residents,
and in general, race relations are good.50
The influx of African American miners into McDowell County
showed the prosperity of the McDowell County coal industry.
McDowell County grew for several other reasons.

The knowledge of

state officials that the state’s vast mineral resources would
encourage the economic growth of the state, the advancement of
new technologies, and the demands of World War I led to the
development of a unique coal society that dominated the way of
49
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life for residents of McDowell County.

The coal companies built

towns and various recreational and civic institutions which gave
the people of the county a sense of cohesion the likes of which
they had never seen before.

Although life was good for miners in

many of the towns, the lack of political power caused miners to
develop a sense of oppression at the hands of the operators.

As

mentioned previously, the early machine technology developed by
the 1920s did not cause a significant loss of jobs.

The early

mechanization of the coal industry did not result in a mass
migration from McDowell.

The situation soon changed, however, as

economic crisis gripped America.

43

CHAPTER 3
THE NEW DEAL AND MECHANIZATION, 1933-1941
By the mid-1920s, the McDowell County coal industry held an
important place in the markets of the world.

Migrants who poured

into the region to find work in the coal mines settled into the
company towns that dotted the landscape.
a way of life.

Coal mining had become

On the surface it appeared that the economy of

McDowell was strong, but industry analysts knew that the coal
industry was already in trouble.
coal industry began in 1919.

A depression in the bituminous

The coal industry recovered from

the downturn, but the industry remained unstable. The instability
found in the coal industry resulted from the very cause of the
expansion of coal mining in McDowell County, World War I.

The

needs of war industries led to the opening of new, marginal
mines.

As war industries downsized at the end of the conflict,

the nation’s coal mines overproduced.
closed and coal prices fluctuated.

As a result, many mines

Because of the importance of

mining to West Virginia, the problems in the coal industry set
the stage for the depression well before 1929.1
Although wartime expansion was the primary cause of the
growth of the coal industry, certain factors influenced the
1
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development of an unstable industry.

The operators in the

Pocahontas coalfield defeated postwar organizing efforts by the
United Mine Workers.

Widespread success in southern West

Virginia during the 1920s evaded the UMWA.

Southern West

Virginia coal was still popular in commercial markets because of
its low-sulphur content and smokeless burning.

Both the lack of

union success and the quality of the coal encouraged the opening
of new mines, which in turn inundated the market with more coal
than could be sold.2
The problems facing the national coal industry during the
1920s were very complex.

The supply of coal increased during the

decade, but demand fell during this period.

Although downsizing

of wartime industries constituted the major reason for the
decline in demand, there were other reasons for the drop in
demand.

Increased output and productivity of the oil and natural

gas industries made oil and gas cheaper alternatives to coal in
many regions of the country.

The invention of the diesel engine,

for instance, led to oil replacing coal as the preferred fuel for
the railroads.

Demand for coal shrank and as the growth rate of

consuming industries grew slowly, it became difficult for

2
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mines to sell coal at a price which covered production costs.3
The labor strife that resulted from continued UMWA efforts
to organize non-union fields added to the problems facing the
coal industry in the 1920s.

Labor strikes, external competition,

and the inability to achieve industry-wide unity of purpose led
to chronic losses for the operators and frequent failures of
mines.

Production, which declined during 1919 because of the

national strike conducted by the UMWA, caused shortages and drove
prices upward.
mines.

The rise in prices encouraged the opening of new

When prices began to drop in 1923, however, operators

were hit hard.

To prevent bankruptcy, operators reduced wages or

used labor-saving machinery.

The reduction of wages led to a

near starvation existence for many of the miners.
mines closed and left many miners out of work.

Many smaller

The mining

community, therefore, suffered consequences of overproduction.4
Coal employment and production nationally declined during
the 1920s.

Employment peaked at 121,000 in 1923, but fell to
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107,000 by 1929.

Production peaked at 146 million tons in 1927

and then began to fall.
bleak.

The future in West Virginia seemed

When West Virginia became the leading coal producer in

the nation in 1928, the state’s newspapers cheered the news,
despite the obvious downturn in the entire industry.

The

Charleston Gazette took an optimistic approach when it declared
that downward trends in the industry “cannot mean anything but
that the coal business is readjusting itself and lopping away the
deadwood.”5

The Clarksburg Exponent, on the other hand, took a

realistic approach when it noted that in 1928 production
declined, companies failed, and the numbers employed fell.

It

was clear to the editors of the Exponent that coal was a sick
industry and that the economy of West Virginia was on tenuous
footing.6
The crash of the stock market on 29 October 1929 ushered in
a period of economic hardship unknown before in the United
States, a period later called the “Great Depression.”

The

economic collapse hit the entire country; banks closed, men and
women lost their jobs, and a general sense of hopelessness
settled upon the landscape.

The depression struck West Virginia

hardest in the struggling coal industry.

The slump of the 1920s

depressed the industry enough to allow it to collapse after the
5
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crash of October 1929.
1929 to 1933.

Coal production fell forty percent from

This drop in production, in and of itself, would

not have been a problem if market demand had remained steady.
But demand did not remain steady, instead, it fell proportionally
to the drop in production.

As a result of the drop in both

demand and production, wages fell because prices remained steady.
Coal families faced economic hardships never seen before.7
The Great Depression particularly damaged McDowell County.
Because of the importance of the coal industry to the people of
the county, the continued downturn in coal, along with the
overall economic malaise, created a sense of despair among the
miners of the county.

During the depression, thirty of the

county’s ninety mines closed; 5,000 of McDowell’s miners lost
their jobs; and the remaining 14,000 worked only a few days per
week.

At best, a mining family could barely expect to survive on

the reduced wages miners earned.

At worst, a family faced the

prospect of starvation and homelessness, because the dominance of
coal in McDowell did not allow laid-off miners an opportunity to
find other work.

Migration was not an option because jobs were

scarce throughout the nation.

Mining families had to find ways

to survive their predicament.8
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As the depression deepened in West Virginia, conditions
developed statewide that were among the worst in the United
States.

Some 33,000 coal jobs disappeared as statewide coal

production fell from 146 million tons in 1927 to 83.3 million
tons in 1932.

Throughout the state, coal families lost their

homes and became trapped in a culture of hopelessness.

Relief

for the suffering families became a top priority for local
government officials.9
Local governments and relief agencies exerted much effort to
find aid for the suffering citizens of West Virginia, yet budget
problems and the scope of the crisis rendered them helpless in
the effort to provide relief.

Every county dealt with the crisis

in its own way, because fiscal conservatives controlled the state
legislature and refused to aid the counties in their relief
efforts.

In McDowell, the county court met in November 1930 to

discuss the burgeoning problem.

After the meeting, the court

asked the coal operators of the county to divide available work
among each family head so that everyone had an opportunity to
work each week.

The commissioners further argued that “it should

be the responsibility of the large coal companies to prevent

(April 1977): 223.
9

West Virginia Commissioner of Labor, 21st Biennial Report of
the Department of Labor, 6 in Thomas, 27.
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suffering in their camps whenever possible,” and urged the
companies to cooperate with charitable organizations.10
Some government officials believed that relief efforts were
not necessary.

A sense permeated American society in the 1930s

that assistance could easily lead to a welfare society.
Conservative Americans argued that people, if given aid of any
kind, would not work and contribute to society.

Every relief

organization struggled with the problem of identifying those who
were only interested in a “free ride.”

In McDowell, the county

court sought assistance from the coal companies in identifying
those worthy of assistance. Identification by the coal operators
of needy applicants, who were willing to work if given the
chance, resulted in a denial of aid to loafers so the assistance
could go to those who were truly worthy.11
As the economic crisis deepened in McDowell County, coal
mining employment continued to decline.

County and private

relief efforts could not help everyone in need.

Many of the

people who usually contributed to relief efforts quickly found
themselves on the relief rolls.

Conditions deteriorated so much

that county officials petitioned the state for funding to cover
growing assistance needs.

The problems in McDowell influenced

10
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11
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many areas of life.

Six thousand children of McDowell County

could not attend school due to a lack of clothing and books.
Sanitation and nutrition diminished for those who still lived in
coal camps.

An alarming growth in the incidences of typhoid,

diphtheria, and dysentery were reported in McDowell County coal
towns.12
As the election of 1932 approached, there was no end in
sight for the economic crisis.

The Republican administration of

Herbert Hoover supported traditional relief programs, those
provided by private individuals and charities.

It was clear that

the approach of the administration was not working.

In the

election of 1932, the voters of West Virginia supported the
Democratic presidential nominee, Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt
of New York.

The election of the Democrats in 1932 indicated

that West Virginians realized that the Republican approach was
not working and government relief programs were necessary.
Riding the tidal wave of discontent, Roosevelt defeated the
incumbent, President Herbert Hoover, in the presidential election
of 1932.

Immediately, President Roosevelt began to change the

way in which the country helped those affected by the economic
collapse.

12

The New Deal, as Roosevelt’s program came to be
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called, was a set of initiatives designed to stabilize the
economy, aid in relief efforts, and stabilize industry.13
The relief programs were radical in nature.

When Secretary

of the Interior Harold Ickes visited Shepherdstown in October
1933, he declared that the election of 1932 had signaled a social
revolution.

Ickes also argued that the election marked the

passing of the old order and the rise of a new order committed to
the common good.

The new philosophy of a commitment to the

welfare of all citizens allowed a change in the rights of working
people.14
Was the New Deal actually radical?

Some scholars argue that

the New Deal was conservative in nature because it saved
capitalism.

Louis Galambos, in his work Competition and

Cooperation, argues that the NRA, despite the philosophy of
industrial control, was actually controlled by what he calls
“businesscrats.”

The subcodes for the thread industry were not

able to win final approval until the committee writing the codes
removed all provisions dealing with price and production control.
The lack of price and production control made the special codes
virtually worthless.

In Testing of the New Deal, Janet Irons

agrees with Galambos’ assessment of the New Deal as conservative.

13

Ibid., 69.

14
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Irons’ argument focuses on the failure of the general textile
strike of 1934 that affected much of the South.

The failure of

unionization and the blacklisting of workers, along with the
rising influence of business-oriented policymakers, was evident
after the Supreme Court ruled that the NIRA was unconstitutional
in 1935.15
The passage of the NIRA in 1933 influenced industry in
several different ways.

The NIRA set forth a general procedure

for the formation of industrial wage and price codes.

The

establishment of the industrial codes fell under the National
Recovery Administration(NRA).

The NIRA did not, however, provide

guidelines as to the type of provisions to be found in the codes.
The only specifics required to be included in the codes were
those dealing with labor.

The rest of the industrial codes were

negotiated by labor and industry.

Section 7 of the NIRA

stipulated that the codes would set minimum wages, maximum hours,
and appropriate working conditions for the workers.

Section 7A

outlawed yellow-dog contracts and guaranteed the right of labor
to collective bargaining.
well.

The NIRA gave operators privileges as

Businesses which accepted the industrial code agreements

15
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would be exempt from antitrust laws.

Widespread acceptance of

the codes served as a stabilizing agent for the coal industry.16
The NIRA was significant because it was the first peacetime
attempt by the national government to regulate industry.

During

the latter part of 1933, representatives of various industries
promulgated codes of fair practice under the direction of the
NRA.

The negotiations were tense in most industries, however,

because business and labor representitives had different ideas
concerning how to solve the nation’s economic problems.

Business

negotiators wanted to protect business, government officials
wanted to protect competition, and organized labor wanted to
protect labor interests.
reasons.

The NIRA ultimately failed for several

First, the NRA tried to accommodate too many

contradictory interests.

Second, the federal government did not

have the resources to regulate business adequately.
that to the trade associations.

They left

The lack of capable government

support of the NIRA doomed it to failure.17
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The coal industry found the task of enacting the industrial
codes difficult because mining and wage standards varied in all
thirty-three mining states.

The differences of the coal mining

states in regard to unionization impeded the future negotiations
of the coal code.

Another problem was the lack of knowledge

General Hugh Johnson, head of the NRA, had of the coal industry.
Johnson’s ignorance retarded the debates on a code of fair
competition rather than aiding them.18
The negotiations for a code of fair competition were going
fine until Johnson, on 22 August 1933, stated that he would
clarify section 7A.

The southern operators believed that Johnson

threatened their interests and immediately refused to bargain
further.

Consequentially, negotiations came to a halt.

was also dissension among the operators.

There

Because the Illinois

and Indiana coal fields were unionized, it was very difficult to
get the operators to agree among themselves on anything.
Southern operators wanted regional codes in order to protect
their interests.

Northern operators and the union argued for a

single national code in order to achieve parity and unionism in
the South.

General Johnson worked diligently to coerce the

industry representatives to sign the code, but the debates
dragged on through the summer.

On 14 September 1933, President

Roosevelt told representatives that if they did not come to an
18

Charleston Gazette, 10 September 1933; Thomas, 97.
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agreement within twenty-four hours, he would impose one.

The

committee reached agreement one hour before the deadline, but the
pact would prove to be a very fragile one.19
The code was a compromise between operators of union fields
and operators of non-union fields because it required a national
board, pursuant to the wishes of the union operators, yet the
code also allowed for regional boards to handle disputes, which
the non-union operators advocated.

The code provided for five

regional divisions and fifteen wage districts.

A national board

governed the industry and each division had its own labor board
to handle disputes.20
Together with the code agreements, the committee also signed
the Appalachian agreement on 21 September 1933.

The Appalachian

agreement was a labor compact which gave the code national
recognition.

The agreement provided for an eight-hour day and

forty hour week, the right of the miners to choose their own
checkweighmen, the end of compulsory purchases at the company
store, the abolition of scrip, the end of required housing, the

19
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institution of a minimum age of seventeen to work in the mines,
and the right to collective bargaining.

The right to collective

bargaining in the Appalachian agreement was significant because
it was the first time that the non-union operators agreed to
transfer this right to miners.21
The NIRA aided the UMWA in its efforts to organize the
southern West Virginia coalfields.

Section 7A gave a languishing

organization needed momentum to conduct a largely successful
organizational drive in southern West Virginia.

The success of

the membership drive did not derive only from the changes
instituted by the NIRA.

Even before the passage of section 7A,

John L. Lewis, president of the UMWA, began planning the most
extensive unionization movement in West Virginia history.

It is

clear that the success of such a movement, in the absence of
section 7A, was doubtful.

During the drive, many organizers told

the crowds, “The president wants you to join the union.”

The

tactic of invoking the president seemed to make joining the union
synonymous with patriotism, yet when asked, organizers admitted
that they meant the president of the union.

Before the

organization drive by the UMWA, wages in southern West Virginia
were as low as $1.50 a day.

After the Appalachian Agreement was

signed, wages were about $4.20 a day, only about fifty cents
21

Paul Salstrom, Appalachia’s Path to Dependency (Lexington:
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below the minimum for the Central Competitive Field.

More

importantly, changes resulting from the NIRA produced a higher
degree of labor stability in the coal industry, or so it
seemed.22
On the state level, the NIRA had many economic, social, and
political consequences.

In keeping with the spirit of the NIRA,

the state government of West Virginia struck several blows to the
old order.

In October, 1934, Governor Herman Kump ordered

Sheriff Maginnis Hatfield of McDowell County to disarm and
disband the 195 deputies who had public authority, but were paid
and controlled by the operators.

In 1935, the state legislature

abolished the mine-guard system, approved a prevailing wage-rate
law, amended workmen’s compensation, and provided compensation
for victims of silicosis.

Within a five-year period, it seemed

that miners in West Virginia were freed from the yolk of
oppression by the operators.

Yet, problems still existed in the

coal industry.23
Despite the apparently harmonious relationship between labor
and industry in West Virginia, defenders of the old order did not
disappear.

At the twenty-seventh annual meeting of the West

22
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Virginia Coal Mining Institute, for instance, William Beury,
vice-president of Algoma Coal Company, defended practices
outlawed by the NRA.

Beury argued that it was necessary for coal

operators to be patriarchs for their miners.

Companies required

camps because the areas where coal could be found were so
desolate that adequate housing did not exist.

After the coal

industry expanded, the camps kept the workers satisfied.

Beury

argued that payment in scrip protected families because wages
could be used for liquor or labor racketeers,(i.e. union
organizers).

Beury continued the tradition of “paternalism” by

arguing that miners would not or could not provide for their
families.

Beury also believed that mine guards were superior to

elected officials because they were controlled by the company.24
The NRA failed to address a number of problems common to the
coal industry.

Overproduction was the most serious of these

difficulties.

Price increases exacerbated overproduction by

giving the small operators incentive to open marginal mines.

The

reduction in hours by the NRA lowered non-day production and
increased hourly wages.
the cost of labor.

These factors led to a large increase in

Because of higher labor costs, operators

24
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began to strip mine and to use mechanized loaders in the
underground mines.

The use of mechanization, once begun,

intensified until machines replaced most of the underground
miners by 1960.25
By the mid-1930s, the UMWA had entered into a national
contract with the coal industry.
set.

Minimum labor costs were thus

If a company wanted to lower its prices, it had to reduce

costs of production, not by lowering wages, but by employing cost
efficient machines.

New Deal policies alone, however, did not

explain the spread of mechanization in the 1930s.

Low interest

rates and capital costs, an increase in the demand for coal in
1934-1935, the concentration of large-scale production in the
larger mines, and the selection of machinery offered by the mine
supply industry all aided the spread of mechanization.

The

decrease in interest rates and the increase in the demand for
coal influenced operators to invest in the new machinery
developed by the mine supply industry.

Because production was

concentrated in the larger mines which had the capacity to
implement new machine technology, the mechanization movement
affected more miners in the 1930s than ever before.26
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The onset of mechanization inevitably led to the loss of
jobs.

If anything could have stopped the mechanization movement,

it was the UMWA.

The union, led by John L. Lewis, supported

mechanization because it believed that the evolution of the coal
industry required mechanization.

The rank and file of the UMWA

did not agree with this assessment.

At the UMWA national

convention in January, 1934, a delegate proposed that the union
oppose all mechanized mining.

The delegate thought that it was

the union’s place to protect the jobs of all members of the
union.

In response to the motion, Lewis shouted in protest, “You

can’t turn back the clock!”27

The opposition of Lewis to the

motion brought the audience under control and killed the
motion.28
Lewis favored mechanization because he believed that it
would stabilize the industry in the long run.
mechanization for many years prior to 1934.

He promoted

In his book, The

Miners’ Fight for American Standards, Lewis elaborated on his
views that the values of the UMWA necessitated mechanization.
Fair wages and American standards of living are
inextricably bound up with the progressive substitution of
mechanical for human power. It is no accident that fair
wages and machinery will walk hand in hand...The policy of
those who seek a disruption of the existing wage structure

27
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would only postpone mechanization of the industry and
perpetuate obsolete methods.29
Lewis probably was correct in his assessment of the influence
mechanization would have on the coal industry.

Yet the miners,

particularly the African American miners, who lost their
unskilled jobs to machines had every right to be dismayed with
the progress of mechanization.30
What did the New Deal mean to West Virginia?

West Virginia

did benefit from the New Deal, but long-term improvement was
impossible because of the nature of the state’s economy.

The

economy forced over-dependence on an extractive industry that
destroyed natural resources and followed historical patterns of
boom and bust.31

The NIRA was significant because it improved

the quality of life for miners.

The NIRA set in motion

progressive measures that promoted collective bargaining and
abolished the restrictions of the old coal-town system.

Despite

the advantages created by the NIRA, the legislation also caused
many more serious problems.

The protection of collective

bargaining provided by the NIRA introduced new realities to the
southern West Virginia coalfields.

The introduction of

collective bargaining into the coalfields of McDowell County set

29
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labor costs and, because of the problems facing the coal
industry, required cuts in production costs in order for
companies to survive.
machinery.

Cuts in production meant an increase in

It is clear, however, that the early machines,

primarily loaders, did not have an impact on population and
employment in McDowell County.

McDowell’s coal production and

employment grew because of the onset of World War II and the
subsequent expansion of industry.

Once the wheels were in

motion, however, it was impossible to stop implementing laborsaving devices.

The new developments subsequently took away many

miners’ jobs.
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CHAPTER 4
COAL AND MECHANIZATION, 1941-1960
An adequate analysis of the effect of coal mechanization on
McDowell County must first take into account the different
technological advancements of the industry.

Because of the

problems of overproduction facing the coal industry in the 1920s,
inventive effort in mechanical loading increased within the
industry.

Machines held the promise of accelerating the pace of

mining and reducing labor costs, thus raising profits for the
operators.

The first machines introduced in the coalfields in

the early 1900s were undercutters.

Undercutters were devices,

usually mounted on track, which used a chain blade to notch the
coal at the base of the seam, thus relieving the miner of the job
of notching coal at the base of the seam.

By 1915 undercutters

produced sixty percent of West Virginia’s coal.

Productivity

rose from 3 to 4 ½ tons per day, per miner, as a result of the
use of undercutters.

Although it was true that the cutting

machines alone did not adversely affect the miners, the machines
increased the need for hand loaders and, later, for mechanical
loading machines.1
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Coal operators and industry analysts were interested in
manufacturing machines for coal loading.

Some analysts believed

that the movement for a coal loading device resulted from the
control miners had over the production rate.

The traditional

room and pillar method, which gave the miner total control over
production in their particular area, impeded the production rate.
In 1918 E.N. Zern, editor at Keystone Publishing, presented a
paper on loading machine technology to the Coal Mining Institute
of America.

Zern argued that the industry’s labor problems

caused mechanization.

He did not know whether the problem was

“due to the scarcity of labor, its indifference, its
inefficiency, or its antagonism,” but “the fact that it exists is
sufficient.”2
Zern’s analysis is too simplistic to adequately explain the
social and economic forces that contributed to the introduction
of labor-saving machinery.

The inventive effort to replace

obsolete machinery preceded World War I and the labor problems
caused by the war.

The significance of Zern’s argument is his

reasoning behind the use of machinery.

Zern believed that

mechanization exemplified a progression within the coal industry.
In 1924 the industry journal, Coal Mine Management, reported that
there were twenty-seven mechanical loading machines that had been

2
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tested underground.

Through manufacturers’ advertisements and

articles in trade journals, coal operators became aware of the
advantages of mechanization and the numerous loading machines
available.3
Early loading machines varied in many different ways.
Conveyors had to be fed by hand, while other machines loaded the
coal after it had been blasted from the face.

Still other

devices, forerunners of the modern continuous mining machine,
mined and loaded coal in one motion.

The only similarity among

these early machines was that most of them used an electricpowered chain conveyor.4
Colonel Edward O’Toole of U.S. Coal and Coke claimed that he
had developed and built the first “real” cutting and loading
machine in the early 1920s.

O’Toole told an industry convention

in 1925 that his work on machinery lagged because of the
“excessively low labor rates prevailing at the time.”5

O’Toole

stated that the labor costs of the wartime era required some sort
of labor-saving device.

Working in the U.S. Coal and Coke

machine shops in McDowell County, O’Toole devised a system that
involved a cutting chain mounted on a long cutter bar that was

3

Coal Age 25 (17 January 1924):66-71; Coal Mine Management
(June 1924): 38 in Dix, 33-34.
4

Dix, 34.

5

Mining Congress Journal 11 (June 1925): 301 in Dix, 37.
66

used to cut and load simultaneously.

In back of, and parallel

to, the cutter bar was a conveyor that loaded the coal into a
car.

The interesting feature of this machine was that it did not

require drilling and blasting, but rather it used the weight of
the rock to crush the coal as it was cut.
onto the conveyor as the machine worked.

The broken coal fell
The O’Toole machine

required a long-wall, retreating system layout in the mine
instead of the traditional room and pillar layout.

Miners worked

long-wall rooms out to a distance of about 600 feet, with pillars
of coal left between each room.

Besides the pillars of coal,

roof support was provided by hydraulic jacks and collapsible
timber cribs.

As mining progressed, miners removed the cribs set

behind the jacks and allowed the roof to cave in.6
The O’Toole machine did not succeed in changing the way
miners dug coal.

Because the coal industry was firmly committed

to the traditional room and pillar method of mining, O’Toole’s
system received little attention from the industry as a whole.
The O’Toole machine, and other early mining and loading machines
like it, can be considered the predecessors of the continuous
mining machines, but they did not aid the evolution of mobile
loaders, which changed room and pillar mining.7
6
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Operators introduced loading machines after World War I, but
in the years prior to 1933, their use was confined to northern,
union coalfields.

After the passage of the NIRA in 1933,

machinery rapidly entered West Virginia.

For example, during

that year, coal loaded by machines in West Virginia constituted
less than one percent of total production, but by 1940 the
proportion had risen to over seventy percent.

During this period

of rapid expansion of mechanical loading, the favorite machine of
the industry was one that could be moved from room to room and
was adaptable to different mining conditions.
miner, invented such a machine.

Joseph Joy, a

The Joy loader became synonymous

with coal mechanization and became the most widely-used loader in
the coal fields of McDowell County.8
Joseph Joy was, by far, the most prolific contributor to
mine mechanization.

Between 1902 and 1944, Joy received 106

patents on different types of mining equipment.

The most

important of Joy’s inventions was the coal loader, conceptualized
in 1903, which dominated the market for years.9
Joy designed his first invention in 1903 to undercut the
coal face.

Joy received a patent for his machine, but he never

8
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marketed it because his device did not contribute much to the
current undercutting technology.

That same year Joy sketched out

plans for a mining and loading machine that revolutionized the
loading of coal.

Because Joy did not have the necessary funds to

build his machines and no job would allow him to use company
property and funds to pursue his goal of constructing his
machines, Joy could not market the machine for twenty years.

Joy

continued working in the mines as a mechanic and continued
thinking and conceptualizing ideas for new and better machinery
until it became possible to pursue design work fulltime.10
In 1913 Joy left his job as a mine superintendent to work
for the Jeffrey Manufacturing Company.

Although his new job

required a cut in pay, Joy knew that he would be in a position to
persuade a manufacturing company to pursue his ideas.

Joy gained

practical experience which aided him in the design of his own
device.

When he believed that the machine was ready, Joy showed

the plans to some Jeffrey engineers.

The engineers knew that the

invention had potential, but company executives refused to listen
to Joy because of possible conflicts with their own designs and
discouraged him from pursuing any more work.11
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Joy’s breakthrough came when he was sent to the mines of the
Pittsburgh Coal Company to test Jeffrey products.

This

assignment was opportune for the inventor because Pittsburgh Coal
was experimenting with several different types of loaders in the
hope of mechanizing their mines.

Joy took a hand-operated model

of his machine and demonstrated how it worked to the vicepresident of Pittsburgh Coal, John A. Donaldson, who was so
impressed with Joy’s model that he requested a machine be built
based on the prototype.

Jeffrey officials had no alternative but

to comply, because Pittsburgh Coal was one of the nation’s
largest coal producers.

The loader that Joy showed to the

Pittsburgh Coal executives was unique.
arms at the front of the conveyor.

It included two gathering

One arm on each side swept

out and gathered the coal into a conveyor, from where the coal
then was loaded onto a hopper for transport out of the mine.12
In the fall of 1916 Joy left his job at Jeffrey to work for
Pittsburgh Coal as a consulting engineer.

During the next two

years Pittsburgh Coal built four loading machines in its shops,
using Joy as a consultant to supervise construction.
Surprisingly, Pittsburgh Coal decided to discontinue its work
with the Joy loader.

It is unclear why the company made this

decision, but Keith Dix argues that there is some evidence that
labor resisted the new technology.
12
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In the years after World War

I Pittsburgh Coal was part of the Central Competitive Field of
Western Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, organized by
the UMWA.

Despite the lack of success in southern Appalachia,

the UMWA in the Central Competitive Field experienced success and
became quite militant in its activities.

During the war years,

1916 to 1918, the UMWA conducted more strikes than ever before.
Employers were forced to make concessions, thus facilitating
Pittsburgh Coal’s decision to slow mechanization in its mines.13
When Pittsburgh Coal ceased using Joy as a consultant, he
decided to organize his own company to manufacture and market his
machines.

Joy was able to do this because the U.S. Patent Office

granted him a patent for his unique loader about five months
after he formed the Joy Machine Company.

The patent he received

in 1919 contained the basic design on which the Joy loader was
built.

The patent protected Joy Machine in the manufacture of

these loaders until 1941.14
The first real success enjoyed by the Joy company came with
its 4BU loaders.

The difference between the 4BU and the earlier

Joy loaders was that Joy decided to replace the wheels of the
machine with caterpillar treads.

The change allowed the loader

to easily move around the underground terrain of the mines.
13
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Dix, 65-68.
14
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development of his next model, the 5BU, ushered in the new era of
loading technology.

The 5BU was the first model to use steel

casings and the conveyor assembly was powered horizontally so it
could move ninety degrees in each direction.15
Corporate financial problems led to Joy’s resignation as
president of the company in 1925; in 1928, the company was
reorganized as the Joy Manufacturing Company.

Despite his

resignation, there is little doubt of the importance of Joseph
Joy to the development of mine machinery.

When miners of the

1940s and 1950s thought of loaders, they immediately thought of
Joy.

His innovation and determination began the movement to

complete mechanization of the coal industry.16
Machinery did not impact the coal industry in West Virginia
prior to World War II.

In 1934, for example, the Annual Report

of the Department of Mines for the state reported that of the
ninety-eight million tons of coal produced by the state, over
eighty-seven million tons were hand loaded into cars.
the coal produced in 1934 was loaded by machine.

None of

Continued

effects of the Great Depression, the lack of available capital,

15

Ibid., 71-73.

16

Ibid., 74.
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and the use of cheap labor, caused the lack of machinery being
used in West Virginia mines in 1934.17
Historians have disagreed about whether southern West
Virginia waited too long to mechanize its mines.

Richard Simon,

for instance, has argued that West Virginia coal operators waited
too long to automate because of “destructive competition” among
the coal operators.18

Simon believed that competition delayed

automation and that southern West Virginia operators harmed their
position by refusing to mechanize.

In his work, Appalachia’s

Path to Dependency, Paul Salstrom debunked Simon’s argument.
Salstrom stressed that southern West Virginia would not have been
economically developed to the extent that it was if the people of
southern West Virginia had not been willing to mine coal for
lower wages than did northern workers.

Coal operators would not

have been willing to enter southern West Virginia because of the
high costs of transporting the coal out of the region.
Mechanization came exactly when it should have, when operators
could mine the coal more cheaply by using machinery.19

17

State of West Virginia, Annual Report of the Department of
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In the late 1930s, the beginning of another war in Europe
caused increased production of war materiel in the United States.
Higher production resulted in a significant rise in the amount of
coal mined in West Virginia.

By 1940, coal production in West

Virginia grew to over 126 million tons.

An expanded movement

towards mechanization occurred during the period before the
United States’ involvement in World War II.

In 1940 West

Virginia miners loaded over thirty million tons of coal by
machine.

Both hand loading from machine-cut coal and hand mining

decreased significantly by 1940.

A movement towards

mechanization of coal mining in West Virginia was evident by
1940.20
By 1940 McDowell County’s coal production followed the same
patterns as the state’s production.

The mines of the Carter Coal

Company, Olga #1, Olga #2, and Caretta, for example, relied on
machines to cut their coal, although miners still hand-loaded the
coal into cars.

The Carter mines in 1940 had fifteen cutting

machines in use and produced about 3.7 million tons of coal.

By

contrast, the Peerless Coal and Coke mines in Vivian were in the
process of phasing out hand mining, that is, mining in which the
miner was responsible for both blasting the coal and loading it,
in 1940.

The company’s production that year was over 700,000

20

State of West Virginia, Annual Report of the Department of
Mines (Charleston: 1940), 22.
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tons, of which about half was still hand-mined.

The other half

of Peerless’s production was mined by five cutting machines and
hand loaded into cars.21
By 1940, neither coal company had made the move to
mechanized loading.

Peerless began incorporating cutting

machines by this time.

The lack of mechanized loading was also

evident in McDowell County as a whole.

In 1940 McDowell County

mines produced over twenty-five million tons of coal.

Of this

total, over nineteen million tons were cut by machine and hand
loaded into cars.

Hand mining was still a portion of McDowell

County production in 1940.

Almost three million tons of coal

were hand mined in the traditional room and pillar method of
mining.

Of the remaining total, over two million tons were hand

loaded onto conveyors and, a little over one million tons were
loaded by machine, continuing the pattern seen within the entire
state.22
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor affected the industries
of the United States, especially coal.

Despite the increase in

production of war materiel since the onset of the European war in
1939, the United States still was not fully mobilized for war
production.

The entrance of the United States into the war also

led to a new, yet familiar problem, that of a labor shortage.

21

Ibid., 42-45.

22
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The coal industry had suffered the effects of labor shortages
during World War I and the shortages impaired the coal industry.
During World War II labor shortages were not as intense for the
industry.

As miners went off to war, coal companies needed to

find ways to increase production with fewer miners.

There were

two developments that aided the effort of the coal companies.
First, the continued use of oil and gas actually helped the coal
industry by relieving the pressures the war effort placed on the
industry.

Second, mechanization allowed coal companies to

increase production with fewer miners.

For those mines that

still used traditional methods of mining, there was a need to
increase production and to mechanize in a timely manner.23
The problem facing the West Virginia coal industry in 1941
was the need to increase production by mechanizing its mines.
From 1940, when coal production was about 127 million tons, to
1944, when coal production peaked at 165 million tons produced,
the machine-loaded portion of the state’s production rose fortytwo million tons, to about seventy-two million.

During the

period from 1940 to 1944, hand mining was completely eradicated
and coal loaded by hand, on either cars or conveyors, fell from
about seventy-six percent of the total produced to about fiftysix percent of the total.
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fell to about 152 million tons, the coal loaded by machine
actually rose, to about seventy-four million tons.24
Coal companies made further efforts to mechanize the coal
mines in McDowell County.

The Carter mines, which had no

mechanical loaders in 1940, had twenty among the three mines in
1945.

The loading of coal for the Carter mines portray the

acquisition of the mechanical loaders.

At the two Olga mines, in

Coalwood and Caretta, about 2.1 million tons of the total
production of approximately 2.4 million tons produced by the two
mines was loaded by machine.

Olga miners still loaded the

remaining 300,000 tons by hand, but the Olga mines began a major
effort towards complete mechanization of the mining process.

At

Vivian, Peerless bought three mechanical loaders and three
conveyors between 1940 and 1945.

The movement towards

mechanization at the Peerless mine began with the introduction of
the new machinery.

Of the about 600,000 tons produced by

Peerless in 1945, miners only hand loaded about 334,000 tons into
cars.

Miners either loaded the remaining coal by hand on

conveyors or with mechanical loaders.

Although lagging behind

most of the other mines in McDowell County, Peerless also strove
to mechanize in the early 1940s.

In McDowell County as a whole,

mechanization continued, yet still trailed the rest of the state

24
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of West Virginia.

Of the approximately twenty-five million tons

of coal produced by McDowell County mines, miners loaded
approximately nine million tons, or thirty-five percent by
machine.

Miners loaded the rest by hand, either on cars or

conveyors.25
The labor shortage symptomatic of the coal industry during
World War II did not impede West Virginia mines.

Total

employment in West Virginia in 1940 was 106,311.

By 1943 the

number employed in West Virginia had risen to 111,746.

It is

clear that manpower needs of the U.S. military did not lead to
lower employment in the coal industry.

By 1943, however,

mechanization of the West Virginia coal industry was in full
swing.

The result of the increased reliance on machinery to load

the coal was a significant and rapid decrease in jobs in mining
West Virginia coal.

By 1945 employment in West Virginia fell to

97,220 workers, a decrease of 8.6 percent.26
Employment in McDowell County followed a similar pattern.
The eradication of hand mining and the rapid utilization of
mechanical loaders influenced McDowell County in a more
demoralizing and destructive manner.

The three Carter mines, for

example, had a total employment of 2,072 miners in 1940.

Of

these 2,072, 1,033 were hand loaders and the rest were either

25
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cutting machine workers or general inside labor.

By 1945 the

Carter mines employed only 1,235 miners, with only 136 miners
still classified as hand loaders.

These 136 hand loaders at the

Carter mines produced 547,165 tons, while only 65 mechanical
workers loaded over 2.1 million tons.27
Peerless’s employment did not decline as much as Carter
during the period 1940-1945.

The total number of inside workers

at Peerless decreased from 403 in 1940 to 335 in 1945.

A large

layoff did not occur in 1945 at Peerless because of the sheer
amount of coal still being loaded by hand at the mine.

While the

Carter mines, by 1945, were close to phasing out completely hand
loading, Peerless still relied on the practice for well over half
of their production.

Peerless employed, in 1940, 132 pick men,

or hand miners, and 131 hand loaders, out of a total of 403.

In

1945, the acquisition of conveyors and mechanical loaders allowed
some of the job losses to be absorbed by the creation of crews to
man the new machines.

Sadly, however, many of the new jobs went

to skilled miners, those already working as hand loaders or
cutters.

Many of the pick miners were casualties of progress.28
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After World War II ended, the move towards complete
mechanization of the coal industry continued.

Lower demand for

coal due to demobilization led to a decrease the amount of coal
mined.

The important statistic, however, was the percentage of

coal loaded by machine.

Between 1945 and 1950, the percentage of

coal loaded by machine rose from forty-eight percent to fiftyeight percent.

It is interesting to note that although coal

production in West Virginia fell from about 152 million tons in
1945 to approximately 133 million tons in 1950, the tonnage of
coal loaded by machine actually increased by about three million
tons.

Employment obviously suffered due to the lack of

production and increased use of machinery in the late 1940s.
statewide employment of miners in 1945 was 97,220.

The

By 1950 the

number of miners employed in West Virginia had fallen to 87,769.
In hindsight, as will be shown below, this decrease was not a
trend that would destroy an industry, but it was important to the
people laid off.29
By 1950 the expansion of mechanical loading continued in
McDowell County.

The Carter Coal Company sold its mines in

McDowell County.

The three mines were reorganized as Olga Coal

Company, after the two main mines owned by the company.

The Olga

mines completely eradicated hand loading in their two major
29

State of West Virginia, Annual Report of the Department of
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of the Department of Mines (Charleston: 1950), 11.
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mines, Olga #1 and Olga #2.

Hand loading on conveyors continued

at the Caretta #5 mine, but the output of the Caretta mine was
minuscule.

Production also decreased to approximately 1.9

million tons at the three mines .

Peerless continued the

mechanization of its mines during this period.

Ninety-three

percent of Peerless’s production was loaded mechanically.
rest was hand loaded into conveyors.

The

In all of McDowell County,

over half of the county’s total coal production of 20.8 million
tons was loaded by machine.30
Interestingly, the total employment in McDowell County coal
mines actually increased from 13,576 in 1945 to 15,812 in 1950.
The same was not true for the Olga and Peerless companies in
particular.

The Olga mines employed a total of 1,118 miners in

1950, down from 1,235 in 1945.

The Olga mines only had forty-two

workers loading coal by hand and those miners worked at the
Caretta #5 mine, which had always been technologically behind in
comparison to the two Olga mines.

The rest of the workers either

worked on mechanical loaders, cutting machines, or as general
inside labor.

Peerless also lost employees by 1950.

The total

number of inside workers at Peerless fell from 335 to 287.

The

primary reason for the continued decrease of workers at Peerless
was the final halt to hand loading into cars.

30

In 1945 Peerless
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listed 116 workers as hand loaders into cars, in 1950, there were
no hand loaders in the Peerless mine.31
During the 1950s companies introduced devices that
subsequently revolutionized the mining process.

The most import

of the devices was the continuous mining machine manufactured by
the Joy company.

The machine, a twenty-six foot long, eight-foot

wide machine consisting of a ripper bar to tear coal from the
face and place it into a central hopper, combined cutting and
loading coal into a single operation.

The new machine shortened

the time needed to produce a ton of coal and did it with much
less labor than traditional mining methods.

A continuous miner

with ten men produced three times as much coal as thirty men
loading coal by machine.

Fortune magazine stated that the total

cost per ton to mine the coal was $5.28 for hand loading, $3.79
for machine loading, and $3.16 for continuous mining.32

The

increased production resulting from the continuous mining machine
also changed the industry.

Nationally, the mechanical loader

caused a twenty percent increase in productivity between 1930 and
1950.

During the 1950s, productivity rose about one hundred

percent due to the continuous mining machine.33
31
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Production in West Virginia declined from 1950-1955, yet the
amount of coal loaded by machine increased drastically.

In 1950,

the tonnage of coal loaded by machine was approximately seventyseven million tons; five years later, tonnage loaded by machine
rose to about 106 million, an increase of thirty-eight percent.
But fewer miners held onto their jobs, as employment decreased
between 1950 and 1955.

The number of workers employed in the

coal industry in West Virginia stood at 89,769 in 1950, but only
47,149 in 1955.34
The early 1950s were critical years in McDowell County.
Olga Coal Company closed the Caretta #5 mine because the mine
ceased to be profitable.

Production at the two remaining Olga

mines increased marginally between 1950 and 1955.

During the

same period, however, total inside employment decreased from
1,032 to 608.

Any production increase, no matter how small, with

an employment decline of the magnitude of Olga’s, was the result
of a labor-saving device, the continuous mining machine.
continued mechanization movement destroyed Peerless.

The

Peerless

did not buy a continuous mining machine and paid dearly as a
result.

Production fell marginally from 1950 to 1955; employment

fell from 287 to 221.

Because Peerless did not further mechanize

Kentucky, 1987), 178-180; Seltzer, 65; Shifflett, 204.
34

State of West Virginia, Annual Report of the Department of
Mines (Charleston: 1955), 5.
83

its mines, it could not produce the tonnage needed to compete
with larger mines.

Because of the difference between Peerless

and its competitors, Peerless went out of business and closed its
Vivian mine in 1960.35
Throughout the late 1950s the coal industry in West Virginia
continued to decline in both production and employment.
Production fell from approximately 126 million tons in 1955 to
about 112 million tons in 1960.

More importantly, employment

fell from 47,149 in 1955 to 35,089 in 1960.

By 1960 coal mining

was almost a completely mechanized process.

Of the approximately

112 million tons produced in 1960, about ninety-nine million
tons, or eighty-nine percent, was machine loaded, mostly by the
continuous mining machine.

McDowell County also followed the

path to complete mechanization.
two Olga mines:

Market conditions impaired the

they produced only about 1.5 million tons in

1960, down from about 1.9 million tons in 1955.

The increased

use of the continuous mining machine caused a decline in
employment from 608 in 1955, to 508 in 1960.

In McDowell County,

production fell by about six million tons and about 700 jobs were
lost from 1955-1960.36
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From the early 1940s through the 1950s, mechanization
continued to affect mining operations in both McDowell in
particular and West Virginia in general.

Mechanical loaders,

primarily the Joy loader, led to the first wave of layoffs in the
late 1940s.

McDowell employment dropped from 17,862 in 1940 to

15,812 in 1950.

Despite the employment decline in county coal

mines, McDowell’s population rose to 98,887 in 1950, the third
largest total in the state.37

During the 1950s the onset of the

continuous mining machine led to a significant decrease in coal
mining jobs in McDowell County.

By 1960 coal mining employment

had fallen to 7,118, a loss of over fifty percent during the
decade of the 1950s.

The miners thrown out of work by

mechanization had few opportunities available to them after they
were laid off.

They had to decide either to move elsewhere in

search of work or continue to remain in McDowell.

Some stayed,

but most families displaced by mechanization followed the course
of many others from Appalachia and migrated to industrial
centers, primarily those in the Midwest.
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CHAPTER 5
LEAVING MCDOWELL, 1950-1970
The massive loss of employment caused by the mechanization
of mining in McDowell County left many coal miners at an impasse.
Miners had to decide whether to stay in the county and try to
find another job or to leave for other industrial areas.

Many

miners chose to leave McDowell County in order to provide better
lives for their families.

The migration of former miners to the

Midwest resulted in a demographic catastrophe in McDowell County.
The migration of former coal miners from the county was a
part of a larger, more extensive, migration out of the southern
Appalachian region.1

The so-called “great white migration” from

Appalachia began in the years immediately following World War II.
As the northern economy boomed, pockets of the southern
Appalachian economy faltered.

The out-migration of Appalachian

residents began soon after World War II and reached its peak
during the 1950s.

People left an economically depressed area

because of the lack of economic opportunity.

Chad Berry, in his

work Southern Migrants, Northern Exiles, recounted the experience
of the sociologist James S. Brown and the Beech Creek community

1

The
southern
Appalachian
region
has
many
different
connotations.
For this work, the southern Appalachian region
refers to that area defined by the Appalachian Regional Commission
south of the Mason-Dixon line and the Ohio River. See: Appalachian
Regional Commission, A Report to Congress on Migration (Washington:
Appalachian Regional Commission, 1971), 30.
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of Clay County, Kentucky.

Brown studied Beech Creek for his

doctoral dissertation in the late 1940s.

When he returned in

1961, he was shocked at the extent of migration out of the
county.

More than half of the residents living in Beech Creek

during his earlier study had left the community.

Even those

people who still lived in Beech Creek realized the problems their
children faced.

When asked if their children should stay or

leave the community, most Beech Creek residents said that their
children should leave because of the employment opportunities
available in other areas.

Southern Appalachia did not offer the

kind of life that parents wanted for their children.2
Despite the enormity of the out-migration from southern
Appalachia during the 1950s, the events of the decade were only
part of a more extensive migration pattern.

Southern Appalachian

migration occurred throughout the decades 1940-1970 and included
a net loss of over three million residents.

Although half of the

loss occurred during the 1950s, out-migration from southern
Appalachia continued throughout the 1960s, particularly from the
coal mining areas.

The economic situation of the 1960s did not

change from the 1950s.

Commercial farming was not a viable

prospect for people of the southern Appalachian region.

Non-

extractive industries were reluctant to enter the area: coal

2

Chad Berry, Southern Migrants, Northern
University of Illinois Press, 2000), 103-104.
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Exiles

(Urbana:

mining continued to struggle.

It was clear that although 1950s

migration trends remained in effect, lower numbers of people left
the region during the 1960s.3
Most of the Appalachian migrants who moved to northern
industrial centers were young and thus gave their new employers
many years of labor.4

Extensive out-migration from southern

Appalachia continued the largest economic boom in American
history.

The desire for cheap labor in the expanding midwestern

industries allowed Appalachian migrants to find jobs easily.

For

example, by the 1960s, a survey of workers in Columbus, Ohio,
found that a third of them were from southern Appalachia and that
about half of these workers had been at their current jobs for
more than six years.

The survey supported the argument that the

1950s was the formative decade of the southern Appalachian
migration.5

For the southern Appalachian region, the years

between 1940 and 1970 saw the loss of 3.2 million people from the
region.

The largest number left during the 1950s, when 784,000

people abandoned southern Appalachia.6

3

William W. Philliber and Clyde B. McCoy, eds. The Invisible
Minority: Urban Appalachians (Lexington: University Press of
Kentucky, 1981), 35-39.
4

The primary destination for southern Appalachian migrants were
the Midwestern industrial centers such as Cleveland, Detroit,
Columbus, and Chicago.
5
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Berry pointed out three important characteristics to the
out-migration that occurred between 1945 and 1960.

First,

Appalachia was not the only area of the South influenced by outmigration, as other portions of Tennessee, North Carolina, and
Virginia experienced out-migration.
characterized migration.

Second, kinship often

Scholars thought that southern

Appalachians were too involved with kinship relationships to
search out a new life for their families.

The migrants

frequently brought many of their relatives along with them to the
North, thus debunking the theory that kinship constrained
Appalachians from seeking economic opportunity.

Third,

Appalachians who migrated found economic success in their new
lives, thus deflating the idea that Appalachians who left became
mired in poverty in the Midwest.7
The automation of industry in southern Appalachia had a
negative influence on the region.

Appalachia was unable to cope

with changes in industry, because of the region’s over reliance
on extractive industries, such as coal and timber.

For example,

Harry Caudill discussed the effect of resource exploitation in
the Cumberland Plateau in his work Night Comes to the
Cumberlands.

Caudill argued that the process of automation in

the numerous industries of the Cumberlands led to thousands of
Appalachians joining the wholesale exodus from the region.
7

Ibid., 104.
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Those

people who remained had to contend with widespread unemployment
and the development of welfare programs by both the federal
government and the UMWA.8
The coal mining areas of Appalachia, including McDowell
County, probably contributed more to the great Appalachian
migration than any other regions in Appalachia.

The operators’

increased reliance on mechanization required the coal miners of
McDowell to make the hard decisions required by unemployment.
From 1940 to 1960 the total inside employment in McDowell County
coal mines fell from 17,862 to 7,118.9

Because the county’s

economy depended solely on coal, the miners who found themselves
out of work turned to migration to ensure the survival of their
families.

In the twenty years from 1950 to 1970, the population

of the county fell from 98,887 to 50,666, a loss of over
48,000.10
The mechanization of the coal mines and the population
decrease that accompanied the wholesale loss of jobs produced by

8

Harry M. Caudill, Night Comes to the Cumberlands: A Biography
of a Depressed Area (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1963),
263-273.
9
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10
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mechanization during the 1950s led to an important social change
in McDowell County.

Company stores closed throughout the county;

movie theaters and other recreational institutions shut down; and
transportation services ceased to operate.

The continued

migration of McDowell’s residents changed life in the county.
Many of the ex-miners relocated to such midwest industrial
centers as Detroit, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Columbus.

Many of

the Peerless miners who were left without work when the company
folded in 1960, went to Columbus, where many took jobs with the
Joy Company which, ironically, manufactured much of the equipment
that put miners out of work.11
McDowell residents in particular, and West Virginians in
general, did not fully accept the state’s economic decline as
permanent.

Many migrants traveled to midwestern industrial

centers to find work, but planned to return home when they saved
some money or when the economic prognosis back home looked
promising.

The miner continued moving back and forth for some

time, until he realized that the coal industry was in a permanent
decline and jobs would never again be plentiful in the county.12
Mechanization affected African-American miners much more
harshly than white miners, despite the description of the

11

Floyd Hendricks, interview by author, Vivian, WV, 8 March

12
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Appalachian migration as the “great white migration.”

Much of

the harsh effect of mechanization on African American miners
resulted from the lack of support given them by the UMWA.

The

UMWA helped all miners with increased wages, better working
conditions, and protection from arbitrary treatment, but did not
obtain equality for African American miners in hiring practices.
Companies often relegated black miners to general labor jobs or
hand-loading jobs.

Because these types of jobs were the first to

be eliminated when mechanization began in the mining industry,
African-Americans disproportionately bore the brunt of
unemployment.

Black miners then had to make the unwelcome choice

faced by other unemployed miners, stay or leave?
southern Appalachia.

Most left

The severe loss of black miners in the

industry particularly influenced McDowell’s population because of
the large number of black miners in the county.

Throughout

southern Appalachia, the number of African-Americans declined
from 42,266 in 1930, to 26,136 in 1950, to 3,673 in 1970.13
Contemporary studies revealed that mechanization exerted a
deleterious effect on McDowell’s demographics.

An economic study

published by West Virginia University in 1969 showed that the
county’s population fell from about 95,000 people in 1950 to
13

Ronald L. Lewis, Black Coal Miners in America: Race, Class,
and Community Conflict, 1780-1980 (Lexington: University Press of
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about 73,542 people in 1960, a loss of approximately twenty three
percent.14

The problems that plagued the coal industry during

the 1950s continued into the 1960s, resulting in constant
migration.

Many coal companies tried to put a positive spin on

the economic problems facing McDowell, as the United Pocahontas
Coal Company did in a letter to their miners in 1965:
United’s coal tonnage and store volume have almost
doubled as a consequence (of mechanization). Such expansion
certainly serves to express United’s faith in the coal
industry’s future and in the people who are United
Pocahontas.
Of course, the material progress made has brought with
it serious problems, many of which are far from being solved
as yet. However, we are confident that, with your continued
loyalty, cooperation, and help, substantial progress will be
made in 1966 in solving these difficulties.15
The optimism exuded by the executives of United Pocahontas was
unfounded.

Continued downturns in the coal industry and

continued reliance on labor-saving machinery caused the continued
migration of the people of McDowell County.

By 1966, McDowell

County’s estimated population had fallen to 58,200, a loss of
about 15,342 people in six years.

The loss of 48,000 of

McDowell’s people led to an increase in the average age of county
residents because the county’s economy did not offer

14

Donald E. Pursell and Gilbert L. Rutman, Selected Demographic
Aspects of the West Virginia Economy, 1950-1975 (Morgantown: West
Virginia University Bureau of Business Research, 1969), 18.
15

Letter from Ronald C. Laither to the miners of the United
Pocahontas Coal Company, 15 December 1965, United Pocahontas Coal
Company Archives, West Virginia Regional History Collection, West
Virginia University, Morgantown.
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opportunities for younger people.

By 1970, the population of the

county was 50,666, continuing the downturn facing McDowell.16
Despite the continued decline in population throughout West
Virginia, the 1960s was a better decade than the 1950s, in regard
to rates of population loss for the state.

From 1950 to 1960,

West Virginia lost 145,200 people, a loss of 7.2 percent.

From

1960 to 1970, West Virginia lost 116,200 people, down 6.2
percent.

The net migration rate fell from 22.3 percent during

the 1950s to 14.0 percent during the 1960s.

Despite the

continued pessimism that plagued West Virginia, the state’s
residents had less reason to leave their home after the shock of
mechanization wore off because the people who remained were
either retired or still mining.17
The miners who left McDowell County, in common with other
Appalachian migrants, faced many changes in their lives.

The

migrants adjusted to life in an unknown environment, Midwestern
cities.

The two primary destinations for McDowell County miners

were the Ohio cities of Cleveland and Columbus.
former miners adjust to their new lives?

How did the

What social

characteristics did migrants develop in the urban centers?

16

Pursell and Rutman, 18-20.

17

Appalachian Regional Commission, Population and Net Migration
Trends in the Appalachian Region (Washington: Appalachian Regional
Commission, 1971), 1-2.
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After moving from their previous homes, McDowell migrants
faced many difficult challenges.
involved many different steps.

The decision to migrate

A migrant faced the severance of

community ties, an identity change, and relocation.

Migrants

modified their value systems to gain acceptance in their new
homes.

With profound differences in the culture of McDowell

County and that of the receiving cities, Columbus and Cleveland,
McDowell migrants faced a very difficult adjustment period.
Clearly, most of the demands made on migrants to conform to city
life required them to change their own values.18
The sociologist John Photiadis conducted a study, published
in 1970, that discussed sociopsychological characteristics of
West Virginians who migrated to Cleveland, Ohio.

McDowell County

migrants were similar to other West Virginia migrants in regards
to their age, educational achievement, and occupations.

Many

West Virginians settled in the Appalachian ghetto, located on the
west side of Cleveland.

The ghetto received its name because of

the large number of migrants who settled there and for the
poverty found there.

Those people who did not move to the ghetto

usually found their way to the suburbs of Cleveland.

The primary

determinants of whether migrants went to the ghetto or the

18

Charleston Sunday Gazette Mail, 9 October 1966; John
Photiadis, Selected Social and Sociopsychological Characteristics
of West Virginians in their Own State and in Cleveland, Ohio
(Morgantown: West Virginia University Appalachian Center, 1970),
36.
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suburbs were family connections, job skills, and educational
level.19
Two major characteristics of migrants were their age and
gender.

Most West Virginia migrants were unemployed men between

the ages of twenty and forty.

In Cleveland, for example, almost

twice as many men aged twenty to thirty lived in the Cleveland
suburbs than stayed in West Virginia.

There were almost four

times as many young men in the Appalachian ghetto than in West
Virginia.20
Education was a very important adjusting factor for the
McDowell migrants.

Education allowed migrants to adjust to the

culture of the cities to which they moved.

Migrants’ attitudes

towards education largely determined the economic success enjoyed
by a migrant family.

In Cleveland about thirty three percent of

the migrants living in the Appalachian ghetto completed high
school, compared to approximately sixty percent of those living
in the suburbs of Cleveland.

Because of the poverty found in the

ghetto and the correlation between economic success and
educational levels, it may be surmised that more people living in
the ghetto dropped out of high school than did people living in
the suburbs.

In both areas, however, roughly the same

proportion, about ten percent, of children dropped out of school.

19

Photiadis, 48.

20

Ibid., 52.
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In his study, Photiadis asked several questions about migrants’
attitudes towards education.

The results of the questions showed

that most migrants held education in high esteem, ninety-one
percent of ghetto residents and about eighty-three percent of the
suburban residents of Cleveland disagreed with the statement that
most young people get too much education.

The problems that the

miners faced at home, they realized, were the result of the overreliance on one industry.

The migrants hoped that their children

could receive an education and make better lives for
themselves.21
Besides economic gain, education also allowed Appalachian
migrants an opportunity to avoid the social stigma that many
poorly educated people suffered.

In the West Virginia

coalfields, because children were expected to enter the mines
just as their fathers did.

There was little support for any but

the most rudimentary education.

With a good education, migrant

children could enter the dominant society and avoid being seen as
ignorant by their peers.

Many times however, the urban school

system created more problems for the Appalachian children.

The

children of migrants entered school systems that inadequately
accommodated their values and in which very little was known of
their culture.

Many times, negative images portrayed in the

media and by educators instilled a pattern of failure in children

21

Ibid., 56-61.
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and led to the lowering of expectations.

Only by overcoming the

inherent adversities found in the urban school systems could
migrant children take advantage of available educational
opportunities.22
Occupational patterns for West Virginia migrants varied.
Nearly all migrants who moved to Cleveland were miners.

The only

difference was the level of skill held by the workers.

Residents

of the ghetto had the largest proportion of semiskilled workers,
about sixty-seven percent.

The suburbanites, in contrast, had

the largest proportion of skilled workers, nearly three times
that of skilled workers residing in the ghetto.

The suburbanites

acquired most of their skills after they reached the city.

Only

about five percent of West Virginians living in the suburbs of
Cleveland were skilled workers before they left West Virginia.
Most were either coal miners or unskilled workers.

In 1965,

suburbanites reported having lived in Cleveland much longer than
those living in the ghetto, about sixty percent had been in
Cleveland longer than ten years.23

22

Johanna S. DeStefano, “Readin’, Writin’, and Route 23: A Road
to Economic but not Educational Success,” in Kathryn M. Borman and
Phillip J. Obermiller, eds., From Mountain to Metropolis:
Appalachian Migrants in American Cities (Westport, CT: Bergin and
Garvey, 1994), 162-163.
23

John D. Photiadis, “Occupational Adjustment in Cleveland,” in
Philliber and McCoy, 140-144.
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The income earned by West Virginia migrants supported their
decisions to migrate.

After initial difficulty in finding jobs,

most earned more money in the city.

Cleveland migrants, for

example, had a much higher income than people who stayed in West
Virginia.

In Cleveland, there was also a differentiation between

migrants.

While ghetto residents tended to earn higher weekly

wages than suburbanites, steady jobs were hard to come by in the
ghetto, thus allowing suburban migrants to earn higher yearly
salaries.

Ghetto residents who held steady jobs usually left to

settle in the suburbs.

Despite the differences within Cleveland,

West Virginia migrants were somewhat successful in gaining jobs
and adequately providing for their families.24
Although West Virginians left the state in large numbers
during the 1950s and 1960s, they were able to make new lives for
themselves.

McDowell County migrants had the same ambitions as

migrants from other coal mining areas in the state:

they wanted

to be able to provide a good living for their families.

Most

West Virginia migrants settled in the cities of Cleveland and
Columbus, Ohio, and faced many challenges.

McDowell migrants

faced the same cultural obstacles as other migrants, yet they
largely overcame these barriers.

Migrant families were able to

achieve educational goals and financial success in their new
homes.

24

Those miners who remained in McDowell County faced

Ibid., 147.
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different challenges.

Many were able to overcome the economic

downturn facing McDowell, yet the county found that the coal
industry was in dire trouble.
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CHAPTER 6
EPILOGUE
Mechanization of the coal industry has, therefore, been very
instrumental in the history of the coalfields.

In McDowell

County the development of new coal technology resulted in lower
employment levels in the county.

Mechanization did not affect

the population and economy of McDowell County until the
implementation of the continuous mining machine in the 1950s.
The evolution of mining technology occurred for many different
reasons.

The protection of collective bargaining by the NIRA,

raised labor costs in southern West Virginia and caused the coal
companies to turn to machinery to offset labor costs.

The

statistics for the two representative companies featured in my
study show that production numbers did not radically increase and
employment levels drop until the continuous mining machine
entered the mines in the 1950s.
McDowell County of 1970 was a much different place than the
McDowell County of 1950.

Many county natives migrated to other

industrial centers in order to provide adequately for their
families.

Throughout southern Appalachia, economic hardships

forced people to move.

Most of the migrants were able to adjust

to the culture of the city, whether it was Columbus, Cleveland,
or Detroit.

McDowell migrants followed the same patterns of life

in their new homes as did other West Virginia migrants.
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These

migrants believed that education was important, were young, and
were able to make more money in the midwest than in West
Virginia.

The loss of so many of McDowell’s young people

impaired the county.

The decline of the coal industry in

McDowell and the beginnings of a welfare society using programs
implemented under President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society
introduced a new reality to the county.
The reliance of the McDowell County economy on the coal
industry left few opportunities for people who could not get jobs
in the mines.

Besides mining and minimum wage jobs, the only

work available for McDowell residents were service careers, such
as teaching or social services.

Without a college education, it

was impossible for people to get service jobs.
There were miners who were determined to stay at work doing
the only job they knew how to do.

Some of the miners who stayed

were unable to find steady work in the county.
became dependent on government assistance.
successful.

They quickly

Many others were very

Floyd Hendricks of Vivian, a former Peerless miner,

was such an example.

After Peerless shut down, Hendricks worked

in several companies throughout McDowell County.

Hendricks

worked until retirement and still lives in Vivian today.
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Hendricks was one of the lucky miners who was able to continue
working and living in his home county.1
Throughout the county, especially in Welch, the county seat,
coal began to thrive again by 1970.

The population of the county

was smaller in 1970, yet coal continued to be shipped out of
McDowell County in large quantities.

Because of an economic boom

for coal, mines owned by such companies as U.S. Steel and Island
Creek Coal Companies thrived and other companies continually
opened new mines.

Unemployment fell to about eight percent in

1970, in comparison to the twenty-four percent unemployment rate
of 1960.

The migration of the 1950s and 1960s opened the way for

such a low unemployment rate.

McDowell County, in 1970, became,

once again, a thriving economic area.2
Other parts of the county, however, reflected the changing
reality facing McDowell during this decade.

Eureka Hollow, a

sometimes forgotten coal town located near the town of Keystone,
suffered widespread poverty with the decline and mechanization of
the coal industry.

Eureka Hollow was not a coal town in the

traditional sense, at least not in 1970.

Eureka Hollow had

neither a school nor business of any kind.
few and poverty was high.

Opportunities were

The extent of poverty was seen

1

Floyd Hendricks, interview by author, Vivian, WV, 8 March

2001.
2

Bill Peterson, Coaltown Revisited: An Appalachian Notebook
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1972), 70-72.
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countywide after the incorporation of the Council of Southern
Mountains in McDowell County.3

When the council sent a

representative to survey the hollow, it found that three-fourths
of the families lived below the federal poverty level.

The

efforts made by the council and other volunteers to improve the
quality of life in Eureka Hollow was met with some enthusiasm by
Eureka residents, especially the new community center located in
Vivian that offered Head Start classes for the children of the
hollow.

Not all county residents took advantage of new programs

designed to improve their quality of life.
too proud to ask for help.

Some residents were

Others were worn down by the constant

pressures of life in a dying coal town.
incapable of helping themselves.

Others appeared to be

Because of the lack of industry

and jobs, by 1970 Eureka Hollow was mired in a sea of poverty and
hopelessness.4
The poverty facing Eureka Hollow were a precursor of what
was to come for the rest of the county during the next two
decades.

Because of changing market conditions and

transportation problems, mine after mine in McDowell closed
during the 1980s.

People were required to choose once again,

3

The Council of Southern Mountains that operates in McDowell
County is not affiliated with or related to the Council of Southern
Mountains that services the entire Appalachian region and is
headquartered in Berea, Kentucky.
4

Peterson, 4-6.
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migrate or stay?

Many more people have left McDowell County

since 1970. The population of McDowell fell to 35,233 by 1990.
Coal production also declined since 1970.

The figures released

by the West Virginia Coal Association for 1997 show that the
county ranked tenth in the state in coal production, with
6,831,201 tons produced.

There were only nine companies

classified by the association as having major underground
operations, with the largest only producing 448,067 tons. Modern
mining methods, dependent on machinery, is evident in the
employment figures of McDowell County.

Coal mining employment,

including surface mining, was 1,261 in 1997.

It is clear that

the coal industry is now on the periphery in McDowell.5
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, there were few efforts by
county officials to entice industry to locate to McDowell County.
There were several reasons more effort wasn’t made to entice
other industry to the county.

First, McDowell has no four lane

highways; the primary entrance to the county is along a winding
United States highway, U.S. fifty-two.

Without good roads to

export products, no industry will enter the county.

Second, the

reliance on the coal industry in McDowell County did not allow
the development of new industry.

5

Today, county officials are

Darrell E. Holmes, ed. West Virginia Blue Book, 1996
(Charleston: State of West Virginia, 1996), 633; West Virginia Coal
Association, Coal Facts 1998 (Charleston: West Virginia Coal
Association, 1998), 44.
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working to turn the economic situation in McDowell around.

Two

four-lane highways are being constructed that will give the
county an outlet for industry.

An industrial park and a federal

prison are planned for Welch.

Both projects would not have been

possible without the promise of quality roads.

McDowell County

will never again be the coal leader it once was, but the efforts
underway could allow McDowell to regain some of its former
prosperity and possibly entice former residents to return home.
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